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Abstract
Colleges and universities discount tuition by providing institutional aid to reduce
the actual amount paid by a student. Discount rates are substantial and continue to
increase, particularly at private institutions. Funded institutional discounts are linked to
gifts or endowment income restricted to financial aid. Unfunded institutional discounts
have no revenue source and represent tuition revenue foregone to incentivize enrollment.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Price elasticity, the change in quantity
demanded based on change in price, proved highly volatile and varied greatly among the
sample and within institutions over time. Analyses found no statistically significant
relationship of price elasticity for either full-pay or aided students with unfunded
institutional discounting. Admissions selectivity was a significant predictor of unfunded
institutional discounting with less selective institutions discounting more through
unfunded aid. The most selective colleges also discounted to fewer students, whereas the
bottom three quartiles aided more than 96% of enrolling students in 2009. These fmdings
supported the conclusion that colleges awarding higher levels of unfunded aid have less
market strength.
Analyses also found no significant changes in the ratio of funded and unfunded
institutional discounting as a result of the economic recession, though unfunded
institutional discounting did increase from 27.3% to 32.3% from 2000 to 2009.
Jeremy Paul Martin
Educational Policy, Planning, and Leadership Program, School of Education
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
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TUITION DISCOUNTING THROUGH UNFUNDED INSTITUTIONAL AID
AT PRIVATE BACCALAUREATE COLLEGES

Chapter One: The Problem and Its Context
Tuition discounting, providing institutional aid to reduce a student's tuition cost,
is a nearly universal practice in higher education (Davis, 2003; Lapovsky, 1999;
McPherson & Shapiro, 1995). Long established in financial aid policies, discount rates
are now substantial and continue to increase, particularly at private colleges and
universities. These private institutions discounted tuition to undergraduates by 37.1% in
2010, up from 33.6% a decade earlier and more than double the rate of their public peers
(Almanac of Higher Education, 2011; Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 2010). In effect, this
means the average student paid only $0.63 of every dollar in the published tuition rate.
On one hand, this helps make a college more affordable to aided students. On the other
hand, this means institutions collected only $0.63 of every dollar of possible tuition
revenue, limiting the total institutional funds available for operations. The tension
between providing institutional aid and maintaining the financial health of an institution
demands constant attention.

Tuition Discounting: Background, and Context
The use of institutional aid to discount tuition dates to the very origin of American
higher education. In 1643, Lady Ann Radcliffe Mowlson donated £100 to Harvard
College for the "maintenance of some poor scholler [sic]" (Harvard University, 1948, p.
135). Lady Mowlson's gift created the first endowed scholarship in America. As early
as the turn of the 19th century, colleges began providing a different form of institutional
aid. Thirty-three of the 39 graduates in Dartmouth College's class of 1806 owed money
to the institution (Hartle, 1991). Dartmouth simply did not collect the full tuition owed
by these students and had no other revenue source to make up the difference. This
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example is among the eru:liest forms of unfunded institutional grants, or discounted
tuition (Griffith, 1996). By the second half of the 19th century, the practice of
discounting tuition became widespread as colleges set tuition slightly above cost in order
to subsidize disadvantaged students (Hartle, 1991 ). More than two centuries later, tuition
discounting is an entrenched practice in higher education.
These historical examples demonstrate two different types of institutional aid for
students. Funded institutional aid, like the Mowlson scholarship at Harvard, is linked to
a restricted revenue source like a gift or endowment (U.S. Dept. of Education, 2011b).
There is no cost to the institution to provide this type of aid. The income exists and can
only be used for financial aid. Unfunded institutional aid, like the uncollected tuition at
Dartmouth, lacks a restricted source of revenue and must come from general institutional
funds (U.S. Dept. of Education, 2011 b). This type of aid includes an opportunity cost to
the institution since the general funds devoted to student financial aid cannot be used for
other purposes, such as operational expenses (Martin, 2004). Both types of institutional
aid serve to discount tuition by requiring a student to pay less than the published price.
From 2000 to 2009,

insti~tional

aid comprised the largest source of grant aid to

college students, ranging from 38% to 43% of total grant aid during the period (College
Board, 2011 b). Institutional aid represents an even larger portion of total student grants
at private four-year colleges and universities. As shown in Figure 1, institutional aid
accounted for 81.3% of total student grants at private institutions in 2009 compared to
44.5% at their public peers. Unfunded institutional aid has steadily increased as a
percentage of total student grants at private institutions since 2002 and accounted for
nearly two-thirds of all grant aid to students at private institutions in 2009.
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Figure 1. Institutional grant aid as a percentage of total grant aid at four-year institutions,
2000-2009. Author's calculations from U.S. Department of Education, National Center
for Educational Statistics, 1999-2009 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
The term "unrestricted" is used under accounting rules for public institutions and
"unfunded" under accounting rules for private institutions. Both terms refer to the same
type of institutional grant. Public institution data first became available in 2002.
According to annual surveys by the National Association of College and
University Business Officers (NACUBO), which defines the tuition discount rate as total
institutional aid (funded and unfunded) divided by gross tuition and fees, the rate of
tuition discounting is on the rise. At private colleges and universities, the discount rate
increased from 33.6% to 37.1% over the past decade (Almanac of Higher Education,
2011 ). As shown in Figure 2, the discount rate for first-time freshmen is even higher,
increasing from 26.7% in 1990 to 42.4% in 2010 (Fain, 2010a; Merea, 2010). The
freshmen differential indicates institutions must provide higher discounts to enroll new
students, which in turn drives up the average discount rate for all undergraduates over
time. Concern continues to grow over the rate of discounting in higher education. In a
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survey of 956 campus chief executives, Lederman and Jaschik (20 11) reported that nearly
a third responded the discount rate is dangerously high at their institution.
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Figure 2. Tuition discount rates for private four-year institutions. Adapted from 2010
Tuition Discounting Study Report by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers, 2011, p. 8.
Colleges as Price Discriminators

Price discrimination is "the practice of charging different prices to different
consumers for the same good" (Desjardins & Bell, 2006, p. 69). Tuition discounting is
possible because colleges are price discriminators, charging some students more than
others (Baum, 1998). By the second half of the 19th century, private colleges charged
tuition above the average cost (Hartle, 1991). The surplus provided by students able to
pay the full tuition price subsidized those unable to pay, described as a "Robin Hood"
effect (Allan, 1999; Hubbell & Rush, 1991, p. ).
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Under perfect price discrimination, the maximum amount a customer is willing or
able to pay is charged (Baum, 1998). Perfect price discrimination requires perfect
information, which is rarely, if ever, available (Basch, 1997; DesJardins & Bell, 2006).
Though willingness to pay is much more difficult to ascertain, colleges do receive
detailed information on ability to pay when a student applies for financial aid. If a
student does not apply for aid, then ability to pay the full tuition is assumed (Ehrenberg &
Sherman, 1984). In applying for financial aid, the prospective student provides detailed
information on family income and other assets. As Martin and Gillen (2011) suggested,
''No one would consider sharing this much detailed family financial data with their car
dealer or roofing contractor, yet for higher education, it is standard operating procedure"

(p. 6). This information gives a college the ability to charge close to the amount a student
is able to pay, even if not the full amount the student is willing to pay.
Under second-degree price discrimination, price varies based on the amount
purchased (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). This includes providing bulk discounts, so that
customers buying a larger quantity pay a lower price. Colleges cannot often engage in
this type of price discrimination, but it can occur. For instance, some colleges provide a
discount to families with more than one student enrolled. This also occurs to some level
when the number of family members in college is considered as a component of
calculating a family's ability to pay. In general, however, a student is purchasing one
tuition unit (credit hour, semester, etc.) from a college.
Third-degree price discrimination segments the market and varies price among the
segments based on demand elasticity (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). Colleges most
frequently apply this type of price discrimination. Historically, students demonstrating
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need were the most price sensitive and provided with the most aid, but recent decades
witnessed a shift as students of means began to compare competing financial aid
packages and demand discounted tuition (Baum, 1998; Brown, 2007; De Vise, 2011).
Colleges now develop detailed matrices to maximize the use of institutional aid (Kurz &
Scannell, 2005). This often results in institutional aid packages increasingly providing
non-need-based aid to students of means. Whereas colleges once used price
discrimination to subsidize students with need, now colleges often use price
discrimination to subsidize students able to pay in order to maximize the tuition revenue
collected.
A college's ability to price discriminate and discount tuition are interrelated.
Price discrimination provides the basis for discounting tuition, but the increasing rate of
tuition discounting actually implies the ability to price discriminate is declining among
colleges (Doti, 2004). Only the most selective colleges, which enjoy high demand from
potential students, maintain strong price discrimination ability. Institutions with less
demand must discount tuition in order to meet enrollment goals (Bowen & Breneman,
1993).
The Mechanics of Tuition Discounting
Figure 3 includes the relationship of price and demand for enrollment in
examining the mechanics of tuition discounting. The demand for enrollment (D) slopes
downward, indicating that as published price (P) increases, the enrollment demand
decreases (Breneman, 1994). The intersection of published price and demand equals the
number of full pay students (XFP). Only a very small number of colleges have sufficient
demand to enroll an entire class of students willing to pay the published price (Bowen &
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Breneman, 1993; Breneman, 1994). The overwhelming majority of colleges are forced to
enroll partial pay students (Xpp) by providing institutional aid to discount tuition along
the demand curve in order to reach the desired total enrollment (XN). The area of triangle
abc is the amount of institutional aid required to enroll Xpp students based on the

enrollment demand, so the tuition discount rate equals the area of abc I (P x XN).

D

Enrollment (n)
Figure 3. The mechanics of tuition discounting. Adapted from Liberal Arts Colleges:
Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered? by D. W. Breneman, 1994, p. 42.

This model demonstrates the difference between funded and unfunded
institutional aid. With funded aid, the college applies actual dollars from gifts or
endowment income to supplement a student's paid tuition to reach the published price.
Therefore, the model does not include funded aid. Unfunded aid is shown to be the
amount of tuition revenue the college could never collect based upon demand for
enrollment. Some administrators may consider the institutional aid budget to be purely
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an expense, something that can be increased or decreased without affecting tuition
revenues (Breneman, 1994; Cheslock, 2006). This model shows otherwise. The
unfunded aid in triangle abc is required to enroll the desired number of students (XN).
Until the mid-1990s, colleges could "gross up tuition revenue" by displaying gross tuition
as revenue and institutional aid as an expense (Allan, 1999, p. 13). Accounting standards
now require noting allowances to tuition, which largely consist of unfunded aid, as
contra-revenue under gross tuition (Allan, 1999). This change reflects the discounts
provided through unfunded aid are necessary to collect the total tuition revenue.
The model also clearly shows the financial gains possible by discounting tuition
through unfunded aid. By providing the unfunded aid in triangle abc, a college collects
the additional tuition revenue from a to c under the demand curve. Breneman (1994)
argued a college should discount tuition if the amount of tuition paid is greater than the
marginal cost for enrolling the student. Marginal costs, the amount required to educate
the nth student, decrease as the number of students enrolled goes up. For example, a
college with 1,200 enrolled students faces a much lower cost to educate the 1,201 st
student.
Reaping financial gain from discounting tuition requires a college has the existing
capacity to enroll these partial pay students. A college's physical and instructional
capacity must be sufficient for the additional students (Martin, 2002). Physical capacity
includes housing, classroom, and dining space. Instructional capacity includes teaching
faculty and space in courses. If enrolling additional students requires a college to create
more physical or instructional capacity, then discounting tuition ceases to be financially
advantageous.
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Applying the model to a hypothetical example demonstrates the financial gain
possible from applying marginal cost pricing by discounting tuition. In 2011, Exemplary
College publishes a tuition price of $30,000 with a desired enrollment of 1,500 students
and the existing capacity to support that enrollment. As shown in Figure 4, only 800
students enroll at the published price. If Exemplary provides no discounts, tuition
revenue totals $24 million ($30,000 x 800 students). If, however, Exemplary chooses to
provide $12 million in unfunded institutional aid, it can enroll the 700 partial pay
students from a to c, reaching the goal of 1,500 students. Enrolling these partial pay
students generates $9 million in tuition revenue [($30,000 x 700 students)- $12 million]
for total tuition revenue of $33 million, a 38% increase over enrolling only full pay
students. Exemplary College's tuition discount rate is 27% ($12 million in unfunded
institutional aid I $45 million in gross tuition).

D

·-~-§

700
800

1,500
Enrollment

Figure 4. A hypothetical application of tuition discounting at Exemplary College.
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Another hypothetical scenario demonstrates how movement along the demand
curve can impact a college's discount rate over time. In 2005, Exemplary College
published a tuition price of$25,000 with a desired enrollment of 1,500 students and the
existing capacity to support that enrollment. Only 900 students enrolled at the published
price, so Exemplary provided $8 million in unfunded institutional aid to enroll 600 partial
pay students and reach the desired enrollment. Total tuition revenue in this scenario
equals $29.5 million [($25,000 x 900 students)+ (($25,000 x 600 students)- $8 million)].
However, the tuition discount rate is only 21.3% [$8 million in unfunded aid I ($25,000 x
1,500 students)]. A change in price moving along the demand curve resulted in an
increase of5.7 percentage points between 2005 and 2010.
D

.....§

-

~

800~

900
Enrollment

1,500

Figure 5. The resulting increase in tuition discounting from an increase in price at
hypothetical Exemplary College from 2005 to 2010.
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Figure 5 illustrates the hypothetical shift in discounting from 2005 to 2010 at
Exemplary College. The increase in tuition required the additional unfunded institutional
aid represented by the area of abde ($4 million) to reach the desired enrollment of 1,500
students.

Causes of Increased Tuition Discounting
A number of causes led to the rise in tuition discounting in recent decades. First,
institutions were forced to meet a greater portion of student need as federal grant
programs and family income failed to keep pace with escalating tuition prices (Basch,
1997; Griffith, 1996; Ruterbusch, 2004). Through the 1970s, tuition prices increased in
line with or below the general rate of inflation and family income growth (Basch, 1997).
This changed dramatically in the 1980s as rapidly increasing tuition prices grew well
beyond general inflation and family income (Hauptman, 1990). Federal grants, including
the Pell grant program, failed to keep pace as a percentage of tuition cost (Singell &
Stone, 2007). Colleges and universities filled the resulting gap with institutional aid.
Second, a shrinking pool of traditional college-age students in the 1970s and
1980s increased the competition for enrollment (Breneman, 1994; Davis, 2003; Day,
2007; Goral, 2003; Griffith, 1996). With fewer students available to enroll, institutions
engaged in pricing competition, offering larger institutional aid packages to entice
students to enroll. This trend has resurfaced with declining numbers of high school
graduates expected in the Midwest and Northeast through 2018, which could increase
price competition among colleges and universities in those regions (Hussar & Bailey,
2009).
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Third, institutions provided pricing incentives to attract more culturally diverse
student bodies (Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 2010; Davis, 2003; Griffith, 1996; Ruterbusch,
2004). As institutions increasingly emphasized diversity, competition intensified for
students with the desired characteristics. Colleges and universities responded with more
generous financial aid packages to encourage targeted students to enroll.
Fourth, the market-prospective students and their families-demanded lower
prices in order to meet institutional enrollment goals (Basch, 1997; Bowen & Breneman,
1993; Brown, 2007; Ruterbusch 2004). Prospective students often pit the financial aid
package from one college against another (Brown, 2007; De Vise, 2011). In this way,
tuition discounting increased because most institutions were offering discounts. The
outcome is often increased discount rates simply to match the rates of competitors
(McPherson & Shapiro, 1998).
Finally, colleges applied marginal cost pricing, taking advantage of the lower
costs of educating each additional student, in an effort to increase institutional revenues
(Doti, 2004; Ruterbusch, 2004). The amount each additional student pays beyond the
marginal cost can be viewed as surplus revenue (Breneman, 1994). When applied to
institutional financial aid, a college or university can offer a larger aid package to enroll
additional students in order to increase the incoming tuition revenue as previously
demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4. The long-term implications of marginal cost pricing
can be negative in higher education, but financial windfalls can result in the short term
(Martin, 2004).
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Clarifying Tuition Discounting Terminology
A point of confusion regarding tuition discounting is the lack of a universal
definition or rate calculation, which is highly problematic in evaluating studies
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Three operationalized terms, each with a distinct calculation, are
used synonymously for discount rates. Although used synonymously, each is targeted to
inform distinct groups of stakeholders. Understanding the differences is crucial to
undertaking any analysis of tuition discounting.
The simple tuition discount, or unfunded institutional discount, is the amount of
revenue forfeited by an institution from the published tuition price through unfunded aid.
It is calculated as unfunded aid (UA) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees
(GTMF), or UA I GTMF (Allan, 2007). Martin (2004) described this as "the true
discount rate" because of the associated opportunity cost (p. 178). For each dollar of
unfunded institutional aid, there is one less dollar available in general funds. The simple
tuition discount is of most interest to the administrative stakeholders, including the board,
president, and chief financial officer (Allan, 1999). This group is most concerned with
the institution's bottom line: the amount of net tuition revenue available to spend.
The scholarship allowance is the total amount of institutional aid provided to a
student and includes both unfunded aid and funded aid. It is calculated as unfunded aid
plus funded aid (FA) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or (UA +FA) I GTMF
(Allan, 2007). This is the rate required of private institutions by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the calculation used by Baum et al. (2010) and
the NACUBO survey report cited above (Allan, 1999). Despite the FASB requirement,
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the scholarship allowance is of most interest to prospective students. It represents the
tuition due to the institution either through direct payment or external financial aid.
The student tuition discount is the total amount of scholarships and grants
provided to a student, including both funded and unfunded institutional aid plus other
scholarships and grants awarded outside the institution. It is calculated as unfunded aid
plus funded aid plus external grants (EG) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or
(VA + FA + EG) I GTMF (Allan, 2007). The marketing stakeholders, including

admissions officers, focus on the student tuition discount (Allan, 1999). This group is
most concerned with the student's bottom line: the amount required to attend the
institution.
From the institutional perspective, the rate of most concern is the unfunded
institutional discount, which reflects only the amount of unfunded institutional aid
provided (Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004). In comparison, the scholarship allowance
contains two distinct components, funded and unfunded institutional aid, both of which
are of interest to the institution, but for different reasons. Funded aid exists as revenue
from gifts or endowment that can only be used to provide scholarships to students.
Unfunded aid requires the forfeiture of general funds that are then unavailable for other
purposes. In purely fmancial terms, the amount of funded aid available is positive for the
institution whereas the unfunded aid provided is negative. For every dollar of funded aid
raised by an institution, the amount of unfunded aid can be reduced by one dollar (Allan,
1999). Colleges should, therefore, strive to maximize the available amount of funded
institutional aid (Martin, 2004). The external grants included in the student tuition
discount provide institutional income and, like funded aid, are positive. Unfunded aid is
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the lone aspect of the three calculations warranting institutional concern. This study
applies an institutional perspective and, therefore, focuses on the unfunded institutional
discount unless explicitly stated otherwise.
The unfunded institutional discount rate focuses on unfunded institutional aid, but
there is not an existing term or rate calculation focused entirely on funded institutional
aid. Therefore, a term must be introduced. The funded institutional discount is the
amount of the published tuition price supplemented through funded aid. It is calculated
as funded aid divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or FA I GTMF. Since funded
institutional aid exists from a gift or endowment source, it supplements tuition revenue
and allows for aided students to receive discounted tuition without an opportunity cost to
the institution.
Another relevant term emerging in the literature is financial aid leveraging, which
is "any scholarship and aid strategy intended to increase net tuition revenue" (Day, 2007,
p. 34). Financial aid leveraging falls within tuition discounting, but specifies a strategic
element. Accepted students receive aid packages based on increasing the likelihood of
enrollment by students capable of paying a large portion of the published tuition price.
As a nearly universal practice, many institutions now discount tuition by default.
Financial aid leveraging is used to convey the strategic importance of fmancial aid
packages in enrollment management (Kurz & Scannell, 2005; Scannell & Kurz, 2003).
A college attempting to leverage financial aid maintains, or possibly even
reduces, the tuition discount rate, but awards the institutional aid to students within a
strategic design to maximize incoming revenue. For example, if after analyzing past
enrollment data, a college finds an additional $1,000 in financial aid significantly
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increases the likelihood of enrolling students paying 90% of the published tuition price,
then the college would shift fmancial aid resources to provide those packages to targeted
students. When those targeted students enroll, incoming tuition revenue increases.
Statement of the Research Problem
Colleges historically charged a surplus to students of means in order to provide
tuition discounts to students with need (Baum, 1998; Hartle, 1991 ). Recent decades saw
the rise of tuition discounting for other reasons ranging from enrolling more qualified
students to enticing the desired number of students to enroll to maximize institutional
revenues (Baum et al., 2010; Bowen & Breneman, 1993). Discount rates have grown
faster than the increase in tuition to accommodate more than just meeting student need.
This increase in discounting implies a weakening ability to price discriminate by colleges
(Doti, 2004). The loss of price discrimination as a tactic to maximize revenue means
students able to pay more are no longer supplementing the tuition of those paying less.
Without the surpluses paid by these students, the foundation of the financial model long
used by private baccalaureate colleges begins to erode. In 1994, the continuing rise of
tuition discounting was described as "among the most troubling economic problems"
facing private colleges (Breneman, p. 36). Since then, tuition discount rates have risen
even further, prompting even highly selective, wealthy colleges to question if the current
financial model is sustainable (Kiley, 2011a). Other less selective colleges with lower
endowments have closed or been purchased by for-profit education companies
(Biemiller, 2011a; Blumenstyk, 2007; Huckabee, 2010). The problem of tuition
discounting exists at the intersection of tuition prices and revenue, unfunded institutional
aid, and demand for enrollment.
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Tuition Prices and Revenue
Increases in published tuition prices have outpaced inflation for decades. From
1989 to 2005, tuition increased at double the rate of general inflation (Kantrowitz, 2011 ).
These price increases are, at least partially if not entirely, linked to rising costs in higher
education. Two dominant theories address the driving forces behind these rising costs.
Cost disease theory holds that labor-intensive service industries face costs that
continually rise faster than inflation due to lagging productivity gains (Baumol & Bowen,
1966). Empirical data supports the presence of cost disease in higher education, which
has seen annual productivity grow by only 0.5% annually since 1870 based on studentfaculty ratios (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Baumol & Blackman, 1995; Trombella,
2011 ). The revenue theory of costs holds that a college takes in all revenues possible
while simultaneously spending all revenue collected; therefore, the only constraint on
spending is the amount of collected revenue (Bowen, 1980). Empirical data also supports
the revenue theory of costs (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). Since cost disease theory addresses
an external force (general inflation driving labor costs) and the revenue theory of costs
addresses an internal force (available revenue), both could be acting in concert to push
tuition prices higher.
Increases in tuition price do not necessarily yield increases in net tuition revenue,
the amount of tuition an institution is actually able to collect after providing institutional
aid. On average, simultaneous increases in institutional aid negate tuition increases at
private colleges (Breneman, Doti, & Lapovsky, 2001). Tuition increases often result in
reduced net tuition revenue at colleges providing high levels of unfunded institutional aid
(Redd, 2000). According to the NACUBO survey, net tuition revenue fell by 2.5% in
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2008 compared to the previous year at private institutions (Merea, 201 0). In 2009, net
tuition revenue declined at 15% of private colleges (Fain, 2010b). The ability to generate
the necessary revenue to meet rising costs through tuition increases is inextricably linked
to the provision of unfunded institutional aid.

Demand for Enrollment
The demand for enrollment drives an institution's ability to charge students more
of the published tuition price. Selective, high-priced colleges enjoy higher levels of
demand for enrollment, which reduces pressure to provide unfunded institutional aid to
reach enrollment goals (Basch, 1996). Less selective colleges are much more likely to
suffer shortfalls in net revenue growth compared to highly selective colleges, which are
often immune to these shortfalls (Basch, 1997). Beyond admissions selectivity, colleges
with lower yield rates face increased pressure to discount tuition (Baum et al., 201 0).
The resulting quest to enroll students can create "a death grip of competition" (Biemiller,
201lb, "Introduction," para. 13).
Tuition price and financial aid also influence demand for enrollment. In general,
increases in tuition prices reduce enrollment demand, which is reflected in lower
enrollment numbers or yield rates (Buss, Parker, & Rivenberg, 2004; Ehrenberg &
Sherman, 1984). Conversely, increases in financial aid generally encourage enrollment
(Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984; Heller, 1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; St. John, 1990,
1993). Even the failure to meet a prospective student's expectation of financial aid can
negatively impact enrollment (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006).
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Unfunded Institutional Aid
Institutional aid represents a major component of grants to students at private
colleges and universities. As shown in Figure 1, the amount of unfunded institutional aid
increased from 57.8% to 63.5% of total student grants at private institutions between
2000 and 2009. This aid provided discounted tuition to students that made college more
affordable, but simultaneously resulted in foregoing possible tuition revenue for the
institution (see Figure 3). As median family income fell6.4% during the recession from
2007 to 2009, colleges simultaneously increased tuition discounting (Ensign, 2010). The
average scholarship allowance provided by private colleges rose from 34.9% to 37.1%
during this period (NACUBO, 2011). Much ofthis increase came through unfunded
institutional aid, which is inextricably linked with demand for enrollment (see Figure 3).

Statement of Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Market strength, the ability to enroll a
sufficient number of students yielding sufficient tuition revenue, is a critical component
of an institution's overall financial strength, particularly at private baccalaureate colleges,
which are overwhelmingly dependent upon tuition for survival. To this end, this study
seeks to address the overarching question: What are the implications of tuition
discounting for institutional market strength at private baccalaureate colleges between
2000 and 2009? The following research sub-questions are pursued:
1. What is the relationship of the tuition price elasticity of demand for full-pay and
aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate?
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2. Given the outcome of Question 1, what is the relationship of the price elasticity of
demand for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate
based on admissions selectivity?
3. How, if at all, has the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates?
4. Given the outcome of Question 3, how, if at all, has the economic recession from
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based
on endowment?
Delimiting the Study to Private Baccalaureate Colleges
Tuition discounting is practiced across the spectrum of higher education
institutions, including public and private, two-year and four-year, and American and
international (Baum et al., 2010; Dotterweich & Baryla, 2005; McPherson & Shapiro,
1995; Parrott, 2008). Private baccalaureate colleges provide an especially appropriate
sample to investigate tuition discounting for several reasons.
Table 1

Selected Revenue Sources as Percentage ofTotal Revenue, 2009

Institution Type

Tuition
and Fees

State
Appropriations

Investment
Losses

All Public, 4-year

20.1

23.5

-4.6

All Private Not-for-Profit, 4-year

77.8

2.6

-93.5

124.2

3.0

-124.3

Private Not-for-Profit, Baccalaureate

Note. Author's calculations from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Educational Statistics, 2008-2009 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
First, private baccalaureate colleges have limited sources of revenue. Whereas
state appropriations provide substantial contributions to public colleges and universities,
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tuition represents the majority of revenue at private institutions (Wellman, Desrochers, &
Lenihan, 2008). Private baccalaureate colleges are particularly dependent upon tuition
revenue. As shown in Table 1, tuition and fees at these colleges accounted for six times
the percentage of total revenue in 2009 as at public four-year institutions and a
substantially higher percentage than at all private four-year institutions. The heavy
investment losses merely amplified the need for tuition revenue in the absence of other
major revenue streams.
Second, private baccalaureate colleges provide isolated undergraduate tuition
data. At institutions with graduate programs, the revenue reported to the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) includes all tuition and fees. There is no
differentiation between graduate and undergraduate tuition. Further, undergraduate
tuition funds more than just the cost of undergraduate education at research universities
(Ehrenberg, 2000). These research-intensive institutions use undergraduate tuition to pay
for other expenses beyond the cost of undergraduate education, such as supplementing
research funding (Ehrenberg, 2000; Sperber, 2001). Private baccalaureate colleges
provide IPEDS data reporting undergraduate tuition funding institutions focused on
undergraduate education.
Third, the tuition dependence of private baccalaureate colleges makes tuition
discounting of the utmost importance to these institutions. A mistake in providing too
much unfunded institutional aid at one of these colleges holds dire consequences for a
fiscal year. A mistake in a single year generally takes four years to fully cycle out of the
institution. Extended or repeated mistakes risk a college's very survival. In the words of
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a former college president, "If you discount too much, you're on your way to oblivion"
(Finder, 2006, p. A16).
For these reasons, this study focuses on tuition discounting through unfunded aid
at private baccalaureate colleges, defined as private, not-for-profit, four-year institutions
in the United States classified as baccalaureate by the Carnegie Foundation with
exclusively undergraduate enrollment. Carnegie baccalaureate colleges annually award
less than 50 master's degrees or 20 doctoral degrees (Carnegie Foundation, 2010).
Limitations of the Study

This study is limited by the self-reported nature of the data analyzed. IPEDS data
is widely used in research given the required submission by all institutions participating
in federal financial aid programs, yet it consists of unaudited reports (National Center for
Educational Statistics, 2011). The lack of audited data is a limitation (Griffith, 1996;
Stump, 2001 ). This limitation may be particularly acute at private baccalaureate colleges,
which generally lack a large staff specifically assigned to gathering and reporting
institutional research data.
Significance of the Study

This study both contributes to the scholarship in the area and applies directly to
practitioners. The relationship of price elasticity of demand to unfunded institutional aid
remains a topic unexamined by previous studies, a gap this dissertation seeks to fill.
Likewise, the effect of the recession from 2007 to 2009 on the balance of funded and
unfunded institutional aid remains unexamined, another gap this dissertation seeks to fill.
The increasing use of unfunded institutional aid and its implications regarding
demand for enrollment threaten the very survival of private baccalaureate colleges. Dana
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College in Nebraska, a private baccalaureate college that closed in 2010, offers IPEDS
data providing financial insight into a dying institution (National Center for Educational
Statistics, 2010). From 2000 to 2009, Dana College saw its unfunded institutional
discount increase from 40% to 53%. In that final decade, between 95% and 100% of
undergraduates received institutional financial aid packages, which more than doubled in
amount during the period. In spite of these measures, enrollment declined by nearly 12%
from 2005 to 2009. This study will provide highly applicable lessons as to the warning
signs to avoid financial catastrophe by discounting tuition too much.
Summary
The rates of tuition discounting have been on the rise for decades. Institutions
should be particularly concerned with the amount of discounts provided by unfunded.
institutional aid. In contrast to funded institutional aid, which has a restricted source such
as a gift or endowment, unfunded institutional aid includes an opportunity cost since
those funds cannot be used for other operational expenses. The demand model of tuition
discounting reveals that the unfunded aid is, in fact, required in order to reach the desired
enrollment. Otherwise, partial pay students would not enroll based upon a college's
demand. Tuition discounting can result in increased revenues through marginal cost
pricing, but often results in stagnant, or even declining, net tuition revenue given the
prevalence of discounts. The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of
tuition discounting on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded
institutional aid at private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009.

Chapter Two: Literature Review
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. This chapter reviews the existing literature
relevant to the topic. First, Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college is presented
as the theoretical framework for the study. The literature is then organized into three
categories: pricing, enrollment patterns, and tuition discounting. Rising costs, contrasting
tuition pricing models, and the current economic climate are explored within literature
related to pricing in higher education. Price elasticity, the effect of fmancial aid on
enrollment, and components of student choice models are explored within literature
related to enrollment patterns in higher education. Finally, studies reporting discount
rates and previous work directly focused on tuition discounting in higher education are
presented.
Breneman's Theory of the Private College
Breneman (1994) posited an economic theory of the private college that provides
a framework to understand decision-making at private colleges in relation to tuition
discounting. The theory's two-stage process of value maximization builds upon Hopkins
and Massey's (1981) economic model of a university.
In the Hopkins and Massey ( 1981) model, universities seek to maximize a value
function consisting of three variables: activities, stocks, and prices. Each variable
admittedly possesses tangible and intangible qualities. Activities include nearly anything
occurring at the university in a given period. Stocks include institutional assets such as
buildings, equipment, and endowment. Prices include tuition, salaries, utility rates, and
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other factors with a monetary value. University administrators seek to maximize the
value of activities, stocks, and prices in two stages. The first stage sets basic institutional
operation patterns; the second stage seeks to maximize the qualitative aspects of the
operation (Hopkins & Massey, 1981 ).
Thus, private colleges establish an operational pattern (stage one) and then seek to
maximize the quality of that operation (stage two) in Breneman's (1994) theory. The
value function v (XQ, Xo * I XN, x*, P) describes this process. 1 In the first stage, the
college establishes a desired enrollment level (XN), fixed inputs (X*) such as faculty and
facilities to support that enrollment, and tuition price (P) to fund the operation. These
variables are highly interrelated. Once established, adjusting any individual variable
impacts the other variables. A college can most easily change tuition, which merely
requires a decision be made and published. Enrollment and fixed inputs require much
more effort to change.
Most decisions regarding a college's operational pattern have long since been
made. Only a brand new institution has the opportunity to establish these characteristics
without historical influence. Existing colleges must act strategically within operational
patterns developed throughout the institution's history, such as faculty size and campus
facilities. Changes can be made, but institutional momentum, or inertia, makes
substantial changes to existing operational patterns difficult.
In the second stage, a college seeks to maximize student quality (XQ) and the
quality of fixed inputs (XQ*). Student quality characteristics include desired academic

1

In the value function, V stands for value, XN = desired enrollment level, x* = fixed
inputs for the desired enrollment, P = tuition price, Xo = student quality, and Xo• = fixed
input quality.
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qualification and diversity levels. The quality of fixed inputs includes faculty
qualifications and physical plant characteristics.
Two constraints bind decisions in either stage. First, an enrollment constraint
includes the number of students falling within an acceptable range (XuL 2: XN 2: XLL;
Breneman, 1994). Physical and instructional capacities largely determine the upper
acceptable limit (XUL) for enrollment. Revenue requirements largely determine the lower
acceptable limit (XLL). In other words, a college equipped and priced to educate 1,500
students cannot generate the necessary revenue if only 150 students enroll. Some
flexibility exists within this range, though physical capacities are relatively static. For
instance, it is much easier to adjust the student-faculty ratio than to construct a new
dormitory or academic building. Second, budgets are constrained by the requirement that
total revenue (TR) must be greater than or equal to total cost (TC), or TR - TC 2: 0
(Breneman, 1994). Stage one decisions establish appropriate enrollment and tuition
levels to generate sufficient revenue for the college. Stage two decisions cannot create a
deficit in the effort to increase quality. Figure 6 presents a visual adaptation of
Breneman's (1994) value function for private colleges.

In accordance with Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college, tuition
discounting decisions can be made in either of the two stages based on the institutional
motivation for providing the discount. In a stage one tuition discounting decision, a
college would provide a discount to reach the desired enrollment level without regard to
student characteristics. In a stage two decision, a college without concern for reaching
the desired enrollment level would provide a discount to maximize student quality
characteristics.
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Figure 6. A visual model ofBreneman's theory of private colleges. Adapted from
Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered? by D. W. Breneman, 1994,
pp. 36-54, 164-166.
These differing motivations illustrate that unfunded institutional aid can be either
a price discount or educational investment (Bowen & Breneman, 1993). A college with
insufficient demand must discount the price in order to reach the desired enrollment. A
college with sufficient demand to enroll an entire class of full pay students can choose to
provide institutional aid as an educational investment to ensure desired characteristics
within the enrolling class. In reality, colleges fall along a continuum between the two
(Bowen & Breneman, 1993).
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Pricing in Higher Education
Price and costs in higher education are inextricably linked. As costs increase, so
must the tuition price. This section explores the literature related to pricing and costs in
higher education.

Rising Costs in Higher Education
Rising costs drive tuition increases (Hubbell, 1992; Massy, 2008). Costs in
higher education have grown substantially faster than the general rate of inflation, which
is commonly measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI measures the
changes in price over time of consumer goods and services, which are organized into
eight groups: food and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care,
recreation, education and communication, and other goods and services (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2011 ). In response to the different goods purchased in higher education as
compared to an urban consumer, the Commonfund Institute developed the Higher
Education Price Index (HEPI), an industry-specific inflation measure. The HEPI is based
on more than 100 categories also organized into eight groups: faculty salaries,
administrative salaries, clerical salaries, service employee salaries, fringe benefits,
miscellaneous services, supplies and materials, and utilities (Commonfund, 2010).
Figure 7 compares growth in the HEPI and CPl. In 1983, both indexes had a base
value of 100. Since that time, the HEPI increased by 181.8% compared to an increase of
120.8% in the CPl. From 1970 to 1979, the HEPI increased at a lower rate than the CPl.
The 1980s witnessed a dramatic shift as the HEPI increased 71.4% compared to an
increase of 56.1% in the CPI, a difference of 15.2 percentage points. This coincides with
the rapid growth of tuition during the same timeframe (Hauptman, 1990).
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Figure 7. Comparing inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index and Higher
Education Price Index, 1961-2010. Adapted from Higher Education Price Index: 2010
Update by the Commonfund Institute, 2010.
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Higher Education Price Index, 1981-2010. Adapted from Higher Education Price Index:
2010 Update by the Commonfund Institute, 2010; and Trends in College Pricing 2011 by
College Board, 2011.
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As shown in Figure 8, tuition and the HEPI increased at similar rates through
1999. In seven out of the ten years from 2000 to 2009, the HEPI actually rose at a faster
rate than tuition. This data supports the premise that rising costs drive tuition price
increases and also indicates that institutional revenues must be maximized in order to
keep pace with inflation as measured by the HEPI (Massy, 2008).
Two theories address the continually rising costs in higher education: cost disease
theory and the revenue theory of costs. Cost disease, first proposed by Baumol and
Bowen (I966), links cost increases to inflationary forces external to the institution
(Martin & Gillen, 20II). The revenue theory of costs, proposed by Bowen (I980), links
cost increases to internal forces, namely an insatiable hunger for more revenue to spend
(Martin & Gillen, 20 II). Given the distinct external and internal nature of the forces
behind the respective theories, both theories may act in concert to drive increasing costs
in higher education.
Cost Disease Theory.
Baumol and Bowen (1966) first proposed cost disease in relation to the arts,
noting that a string quartet required the same amount oflabor today as centuries ago.
Increased wages generally result from gains in productivity, yet, in the case of a string
quartet, costs continue to rise despite a constant productivity level. Cost disease theory
holds that as wages rise in general, the wages for skilled labor must rise even faster to
attract and retain talent. As such, industries requiring intensive personal application of
skilled labor suffer increasing labor costs that outpace general inflation despite limited or
no productivity gains (Baumol & Bowen, I966). Higher education is plagued by cost
disease given the required personal attention of skilled labor (predominately faculty
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work) and limited ability of technology to alleviate demands on labor (Baumol &
Blackman, 1995). Even in the growing online sector, a professor is still required to
encourage and evaluate student learning.
Based on student-faculty ratios, Baumol and Blackman (1995) offer a crude
estimate of0.5% annual growth in higher education productivity since 1870. This
estimate, in combination with 7.6% average annual increases in expenditures per student
from 1949 to 1991, supports the presence of cost disease in higher education. Labor
productivity gains in higher education have been minimal while costs simultaneously
exceeded the general rate of inflation.

An analysis of industry-specific data from 1949 to 1994 also supports the
presence of cost disease in higher education. Archibald and Feldman (2008) used data on
personal consumption expenditures to examine changes in costs across industry
categories, finding that costs of higher education outpaced those of manufacturing
industries such as automobiles or shoes. In fact, higher education costs eclipsed the
growth of health care costs and were exceeded only by the growth of costs for legal
services (Archibald & Feldman, 2008).
A subsequent analysis using a similar framework found personnel costs were the
main driver of cost increases in higher education from 1961 to 2008. Breaking down the
components of the Higher Education Price Index, Trombella (20 11) found personnel
costs, which include professional and nonprofessional salaries, fringe benefits, and total
personal compensation, grew faster than any other component of this industry-specific
inflation index. This study simultaneously documented the faster rise of the HEPI
compared to the CPI as well as the growth of HEPI components. The cost of contracted
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services grew at a slower rate than the overall HEPI, suggesting the cost-saving strategies
of outsourcing services and using adjunct faculty reaped some savings and are likely to
continue expanding.
The fmdings of Archibald and Feldman (2008) and Trombella (2011) support the
presence of cost disease in higher education as well as other industries. The rising costs
pressure colleges to increase prices, which in turn require increased discounts to meet
enrollment goals. Private baccalaureate colleges, which are highly dependent on tuition
revenue, face conflicting demands: the pressure to increase revenue to meet rising costs
and the pressure to provide more financial aid to offset rising tuition prices.

The Revenue Theory of Costs.
Stated simply, the revenue theory of costs holds that colleges take in as much
revenue as possible, and then spend all of it (Bowen, 1980). Under this scenario, the only
limit to expenditures is the amount of available revenue. Bowen (1980) described the
circumstances behind the theory as follows:
Colleges and universities have no strong incentive to cut costs in quest of profits
because they do not seek profit. They are not forced by competition to lower
costs in order to survive. This is so partly because they are subsidized by
government and philanthropy and partly because they are shielded from
competition by geographic location and by differentiation of services. It is so also
because institutions know little about the relationship between their expenditures
and their educational outcomes, and it is easy to drift into the comfortable belief
that increased expenditures will automatically produce commensurately greater
outcomes. Under these conditions, the unit costs of operating colleges or
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universities are set more largely by the amount of money institutions are able to
raise per unit of service rendered than by the inherent technical requirements of
conducting their work. Within wide limits, institutions can adjust to whatever
amount of money they are able to raise. When resources are increased, they find
uses for the funds, and unit costs go up. When resources are decreased, they
express keen regret and protest, but in the end they accept the inevitable, and unit
costs go down. (p. 15)
The driving force behind costs is internal under this theory (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). A
college will increase, hold steady, or decrease costs as dictated by its revenue. According
to the revenue theory of costs, colleges will continue to raise tuition until the market
ceases to bear the increases. At, but not until, that point, a college will be forced to
address its spiraling costs.
Analyzing the relationship of external financial aid, costs in higher education, and
institutional spending patterns, Martin and Gillen (20 11) found evidence supporting the
revenue theory of costs. Between 1987 and 2008, external financial aid increased in
constant dollars at both public and private institutions. Net price simultaneously
increased as did institutional spending. Martin and Gillen (20 11) argued that colleges
and universities merely absorbed the increased external financial aid while
simultaneously increasing spending by actually reducing faculty productivity as
measured by student-faculty ratio. Faculty productivity declines when the student-faculty
ratio decreases since faculty teach fewer students. This decline in faculty productivity
was paid for by merely absorbing the increased external financial aid funds while
simultaneously increasing tuition. This scenario aligns perfectly with the revenue theory
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of costs that argues colleges will take in as much revenue as possible and spend all the
revenue received.
According to Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs, colleges have an insatiable
appetite for funds. As with cost disease, this situation yields conflicting pressures at
private baccalaureate colleges: the continual demand for more revenue and the demand
for more financial aid to offset tuition increases.
In sum, both cost disease and the revenue theory of costs address spiraling prices
in higher education. Cost disease addresses an external component, the increasing cost of
skilled labor due to inflation in the general economy (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). The
revenue theory of costs addresses an internal component, the insatiable drive for more
money to spend (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). Both forces may be acting in concert to
continually drive up tuition prices in higher education. Private baccalaureate colleges,
dependent upon tuition for the overwhelming majority of revenue, must carefully balance
the need to increase revenues with the demand for financial aid to offset rising tuition.
Mistakes in this balance can result in less net revenue, a terrible scenario for a college
attempting to increase available funds.
Contrasting Pricing Models in Higher Education
Two contrasting pricing strategies exist in higher education. The first, often
called "high tuition, high aid," involves publishing a high tuition price with the
expectation of distributing a high amount of financial aid (Hillman, 2010). Publishing a
high tuition price takes advantage of the association of price with quality by prospective
students and may actually lead to increased prestige in the market (Massy, 2008). This
association is often called the Chivas Regal effect (Martin, 2011). The second pricing
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strategy, often called "low tuition, low aid," involves publishing a low tuition price with
the expectation of distributing a low amount of financial aid (Hillman, 201 0). In theory,
both strategies yield comparable net tuition revenue after considering the effect of
financial aid. The sections below describe the Chivas Regal effect and the contrasting
outcomes for two colleges that moved to a low tuition, low aid model by drastically
cutting tuition.
The Chivas Regal Effect.
Named for a luxury brand of Scotch whiskey, the Chivas Regal effect describes
the association of price with quality by consumers (Martin, 2011). Stated simply, the
higher the price, the better the product is perceived to be. Under normal economic
behavior, demand decreases as price increases (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). In contrast,
demand rises as price increases under the Chivas Regal effect (Martin, 2011 ).
According to Martin (2011), higher education, particularly at elite institutions,
offers a prime example of the Chivas Regal effect due to its nature as an experiential
good. In this type of good, the level of quality is unknown before purchase. In higher
education, "one rarely knows how much value has been added until the graduate applies
that knowledge" (Martin, 2011, p. 53). With prospective students unsure of quality, cost
is used as an indicator of institutional quality.
For elite institutions, "the Chivas Regal effect links expenditure per student to
reputation, so reputation competition becomes a race to spend the most per student in a
contest with no upper bound" (Martin, 2011, p. 4). At these and other institutions
seeking to maximize prestige, price can be increased as long as the market will bear the
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cost (Ehrenberg, 2000). In this way, the Chivas Regal effect mirrors the revenue theory
of costs as revenue alone constrains institutional spending.
Larson (1997) attributed the rise of this pricing strategy to Ivy League universities
and other similar institutions in the 1980s. These elite universities, aware of the tuition
prices within the peer group, indirectly pushed each other to raise tuition in line with the
group. In the words of William Massy, formerly of Stanford University, "The theory of it
was, basically, we will raise the tuition as much as the market will bear" (as cited in
Larson, 1997, p. 46). The market, prospective students and their families, actually
encouraged price increases by bearing the cost for elite institutions, which in turn
emboldens other institutions aspiring to be elite to raise prices to comparable levels. The
Chivas Regal effect suggests the perceived quality of an aspiring institution in the market
may increase by raising tuition.
A study of 1,332 colleges and universities, both public and private, yielded results
supporting the association of cost with quality. Among the 859 private institutions in the
sample, Dotterweich and Baryta (2005) found a significant correlation between tuition
and enrollment for out-of-state students. This increased likelihood of enrollment declined
in the lower tuition price deciles, indicating students viewed those institutions as
equivalent substitutes that were less desirable.
Increasing price can lead to an increase in perceived quality according to the
Chivas Regal effect, which in turn can lead to an increase in demand. By pricing a
college's tuition in line with targeted peers, a college can hope to increase demand,
particularly among students with the means to pay for a perceived higher quality
education. In the pricing demand model, if demand increases simultaneously with price,
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the college will reap increased net tuition revenues by charging a higher price while
providing the same amount of unfunded institutional aid.

Examples of CoUeges Adopting a Low Tuition, Low Aid Model.
In an effort to reduce or eliminate tuition discounting, some colleges have moved
to a low tuition, low aid pricing model. Generally, tuition is cut substantially with the
understanding that institutional financial aid is simultaneously reduced. In theory, if the
cuts in tuition are matched by the cuts in institutional aid, there is no loss in net tuition
revenue. In application, the results have been mixed and appear to vary on a case-bycase basis.
Muskingum College in Ohio is frequently cited as an example of an institution
successfully cutting tuition. In 1996, Muskingum cut tuition by 29% in an effort to curb
spending on financial aid (Applebome, 1996). The college anticipated a period of reduced
revenues immediately following the move, planning sufficient time for the strategy to
succeed. The long-term results have been overwhelmingly positive for the institution.
Muskingum's enrollment increased 60% and the college began to draw students from a
broader geographic base (VanDerWerf, 2003). Another concern in cutting tuition was
the threat of reduced student quality; however, this has not occurred. Applications nearly
doubled to 1,750 for an enrolling freshmen class of 415 and the average test scores
remained competitive (VanDerWerf, 2003).
North Carolina Wesleyan College, which also significantly cut tuition in 1996,
did not fare as well as Muskingum College. After cutting tuition by 23%, North Carolina
Wesleyan saw a large increase in students with even greater need than prior to the cut,
negating the expected gains in net revenue (VanDerWerf, 2003). Seven years later, the
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college abandoned the policy and returned to higher tuition levels despite the requisite
financial aid. North Carolina Wesleyan's president at the time concluded, "If you charge
less, people think you have less to offer. Price is associated with quality. There's no
question about that" (VanDerWerf, 2003, p. A25). The North Carolina Wesleyan
outcome supports the notion of a Chivas Regal effect in higher education.
Despite the mixed outcomes, other colleges continue attempting similar strategies.
In February 2011, the University of the South (Sewanee) cut total charges, including
tuition, fees, room, and board, by 10% (Jaschik, 2011a). According to Sewanee's
president, the move responds to both the economic climate, increased competition from
flagship public universities in the region, and a continually increasing discount rate that
had reached 44% (Supiano, 2011a). In November 2011, The University of Charleston in
West Virginia announced a 22% tuition cut for the next enrolling class of students (Kiley,
2011 b). Later that month, Cabrini College in Pennsylvania announced plans to cut
tuition by 12.5% and limit any increases through May 2015 to $1,000 total (Jaschik,
2011b; Supiano, 201lb). The outcomes ofthese cuts in tuition remain unknown at this
time.
The Current Economic Environment for Private Colleges
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010), the U.S.
economy entered a recession in December 2007 that lasted until June 2009. This 18month period overlaps with the last years included in this dissertation. The recession
affected private baccalaureate colleges in two ways. First, endowment values suffered
substantial losses. Second, students and their families were less able or less willing to
pay high tuition levels.

40
The value of a college's endowment affects the available amount of funded
institutional aid as well as supplements the total revenue of the college. From 2008 to
2009, higher education endowments lost an average of 18.7% of their value (NACUBO,
201 0). These losses had still not been fully recovered at most institutions by 2011 (Kiley,
2011c). As shown in Table 2, the endowments with highest values suffered slightly more
one-year losses, but fared better over the three-year period ending in 2009.
Table 2
Annual Total Net Returns for U.S. Higher Education Endowments as ofJune 30, 2009

By Type

1-Year

3-Year

5-Year

10-Year

Public Institutions

-17.3

-1.6

3.2

4.1

Private Institutions

-19.1

-2.6

2.9

4.2

1-Year

3-Year

5-Year

10-Year

More than $1 billion

-20.5

-0.8

5.1

6.1

$501 million to $1 billion

-19.8

-2.0

3.5

4.3

$101 million to $500 million

-19.7

-2.5

2.6

3.7

$51 million to $100 million

-18.6

-2.7

2.7

3.7

$25 million to $50 million

-18.5

-3.2

2.1

3.4

Less than $25 million

-16.8

-2.3

2.1

3.9

By Endowment Value

Note. Adapted from the 2009 NACUBO-Commonfund Study ofEndowments by the
National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2010.
The recession's effects linger through elevated rates of unemployment, which
affects the ability of students and their families to pay tuition. The annual unemployment
rate swelled from 4.6% in 2007 to 5.8% in 2008 as the recession took hold, and then
jumped to 9.3% in 2009, the highest rate in 26 years (U.S. Department of Labor, 2011).
Despite the official end of the recession in 2009, unemployment increased slightly to
9.6% in 2010. Beyond unemployment, household incomes fell to levels comparable to
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1996 when adjusted for inflation. As measured by constant 2010 dollars, average
household income fell 2.3% in 2010 and remains 7.1% below peak levels in 1999
(Dougherty, 2011). On average, Hispanic and African-American households earn less
than the national figure by 24% and 35% respectively.
Reduced endowment values, increased unemployment, and reduced household
earnings affect the market for prospective students in higher education. Even students
from households capable of paying higher tuition rates increasingly compare offers of
admission based on net tuition price after considering financial aid (De Vise, 2011).
Colleges have responded by increasing tuition discounts and providing institutional aid to
a higher percentage of enrolling students (NACUBO, 2011 ). This dissertation
investigates a plausible force driving those responses, increased elasticity of demand
based on tuition price.
Enrollment Patterns in Higher Education
A number of studies have examined the relationship of cost and enrollment in
higher education. This section is divided into literature on price elasticity, the effect of
financial aid on enrollment, and models of student choice.
Price Elasticity in Higher Education
Price elasticity (PE) measures "the responsiveness of demand to changes in price"

(Arnold, 2008, p. 377). It is calculated as the ratio of percent change in quantity
demanded (Qd) to percent change in price (P). The formula for calculating price
elasticity is
PE = % change in quantity demanded
% change in price
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In a higher education setting, enrollment is the quantity demanded and tuition is the price
(Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Price elasticity is not the slope of the demand curve, though
this is a common misconception. Price elasticity varies at each point along the demand
curve, whereas the slope remains constant (Arnold, 2008).
Demand as measured by price elasticity can be elastic or inelastic. Elastic
demand, for which PE > 1, indicates the quantity demanded is highly sensitive to price,
therefore, an increase in price yields a proportionately greater decrease in quantity
demanded (Baird, 1976). IfPE = 1, demand is unit elastic, meaning that any percentage
increase in price yields an equal percentage decrease in quantity demanded (Arnold,
2008). Inelastic demand, for which PE < 1, indicates the quantity demanded is relatively
unaffected by price, therefore, an increase in price yields a proportionately lower
decrease in demand (Baird, 1976). IfPE = 0, demand is perfectly inelastic, meaning that
the quantity demanded is completely unaffected by an increase in price (Arnold, 2008).
Several substantial literature reviews concluded that overall demand for higher
education is relatively inelastic, though the calculated price elasticity varies among
studies over a number of decades (Heller, 1997; Kim, 2010; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987).
Within the generally inelastic demand for higher education overall, individual institutions
can vary considerably. A college should be aware of its own price elasticity in setting
tuition (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A college with more elastic demand will require
more fmancial aid to meet enrollment goals, which negatively impacts net tuition
revenue. If demand is sufficiently elastic, a college can actually lose net revenue despite
an increase in tuition (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Though several studies considered the
effect of financial aid on price as a component of price elasticity, none were identified
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specifically linking an institution's price elasticity with unfunded institutional aid. This
dissertation contributes to the existing body of literature by examining this relationship.
The Effect of Financial Aid on Enrollment
In regard to higher education, demand theory holds that an increase in tuition will
result in a decline in enrollment. Conversely, an increase in financial aid (decrease in net
price) will result in increased enrollment (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A number of
existing studies examined the relationship of financial aid and enrollment. The literature
in this section is grouped by the substantial literature reviews of Leslie and Brinkman
(1987), Heller (1997), and Kim (2010). Finally, other related studies are considered.
The Leslie and Brinkman (1987) Studies.
Leslie and Brinkman ( 1987) performed a meta-analysis of 25 studies published
between 1967 and 1982 examining enrollment demand in relation to price. The included
studies analyzed data ranging from 1927 to 1976. In order to establish a common unit for
the meta-analysis, all price elasticity measures were converted into a student price
response coefficient (SPRC), which is the equivalent ofPE I $100 price change. In other
words, the SPRC represents the effect on enrollment based on a $100 tuition increase.
For the included studies, the SPRC averaged 0.7, indicating that a $100 tuition increase
would yield a 0.7 percent decline in enrollment (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). The specific
SPRC for the included studies ranged from 0.2 to 2.4.
The methodology of Leslie and Brinkman (1987) improved upon previous
attempts at a standardized elasticity value. In 1975, Jackson and Weathersby analyzed
seven studies, fmding that a $100 increase in tuition would yield a one percent decline in
enrollment by traditional college-age students. The SPRC values for the seven included
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studies ranged from 0.6 to 1.9. Though Jackson and Weathersby (1975) became widely
utilized, several methodological errors in conversions and a failure to adjust for the
population studied weaken the results (Chisolm & Cohen, 1982; Leslie & Brinkman,
1987). Given its methodological improvements over Jackson and Weathersby (1975),
Leslie and Brinkman (1987) became the seminal work in the area to that time.
Several of Leslie and Brinkman's (1987) findings are relevant to institutional aid
policies. First, grant aid is more effective in encouraging enrollment than other forms of
aid. Second, reported elasticities are likely inflated due to a focus on enrolling freshmen,
who are expected to be more sensitive to price in comparison to enrolled upperclassmen.
Third, institutions should focus on the effect of price elasticity on collected tuition
revenue. Finally, the positive effect of reducing tuition will be greater than the negative
effect of increasing tuition. This finding, drawn from the aggregate data, has not always
held true in application as previously discussed in regard to colleges moving to a low
tuition, low aid pricing model.
Institutional differences, including price level, student body characteristics,
financial aid, applicant pools, and competitors, create the possibility for wide variance
from aggregate results (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Institutions should, therefore, be
mindful of their own price elasticity and the impact on tuition revenue. A price elasticity
less than one indicates a tuition increase will yield a revenue increase, however, a price
elasticity of greater than one indicates a tuition increase will actually yield a reduction in
revenue due to an enrollment decline (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987).
In regard to the individual nature of a college's place in the overall higher
education market, Leslie and Brinkman (1987) concluded, "Demand is known to be
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affected not only by price but by the money income of the buyer, by tastes and
preferences, and by the value of the good from a consumption or an investment
perspective" (p. 200). This conclusion noted individual preference remains an important
consideration in enrollment decisions beyond cost. The individual nature of college
choice is discussed in a following section.

The Heller (1997) Studies.

In 1997, Heller examined studies using more recent data in Student Price
Response: An Update to Leslie and Brinkman. The data included in the Leslie and
Brinkman (1987) studies stopped in 1976 before the rapid rise in real cost of tuition in the
1980s. In total, Heller (1997) included 20 studies published after Leslie and Brinkman's
(1987) analysis. These studies yielded SPRC values ranging from 0.5 to 1.0, which is
consistent with the average (0. 7) and modal (0.6) values reported by Leslie and Brinkman
(1987).
Thus, price elasticity for higher education overall remained relatively unchanged
in the data analyzed by the studies included in Heller (1997) as compared to Leslie and
Brinkman (1987). However, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 may have
affected price elasticity as prospective students are more aware of and concerned with
tuition price (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). This dissertation focuses
on private baccalaureate colleges, a relatively expensive sector of higher education that
may prove susceptible to increasing price elasticity of demand.
Several of the studies included in Heller (1997) directly examine the impact of
financial aid on enrollment. In a study combining two-year and four-year, public and
private institutions, St. John (1990) calculated a 2.8 percent enrollment decline from a
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$1,000 tuition increase. The lower price sensitivity in St. John (1990) most likely
resulted from controlling for financial aid, which lessens the net tuition cost to a student
from an increase in published tuition (Heller, 1997). St. John (1990) also concluded that
financial aid, in any form, is at least as effective in encouraging enrollment as a
corresponding decrease in tuition. In a study oflower-income white students from 1974
to 1984, McPherson and Shapiro (1991) found a $100 increase in financial aid
corresponded to a 0. 7% increase in enrollment. The exact opposite effect resulted from a
$100 increase in net tuition (McPherson & Shapiro, 1991). In a study of Occidental
College, described as a selective college in California, a $1 ,000 increase in financial aid
yielded a 7.8% increase in a student's probability of enrollment (Moore, Studenmund, &
Slobko, 1991 ). Heller (1997) concluded cross-sectional longitudinal studies offer strong
evidence that fmancial aid affects students' enrollment decisions. For the current study,
this would suggest that higher levels of tuition discounting positively influence college
enrollment choices by students.
Overall, Heller (1997) drew many similar conclusions to Leslie and Brinkman
(1987). Both analyses found consistent SPRC values. Several of Heller's (1997) other
findings are relevant to institutional financial aid policies. First, financial aid packages
do affect enrollment decisions. Second, lower-income students are particularly sensitive
to tuition increases not offset by financial aid. Third, African-American students are
more sensitive to price than White students. Finally, grants are the most effective form of
financial aid to encourage enrollment.
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The Kim (2010) Studies.
Just as Heller (1997) provided an update to Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Kim
(20 10) provided an update to Heller, though without calculating SPRC values. Several of
the studies included in Kim's (2010) research focused on private colleges, which is
highly relevant to this dissertation on private baccalaureate colleges.
In a study of 82 selective liberal arts colleges providing data to the Higher

Education Data Sharing Consortium from 1988 to 1990, Parker and Summers (1993)
found increasing tuition significantly discouraged enrollment by both accepted full-pay
and aided applicants. Highly ranked colleges with substantial non-tuition revenues such
as endowments attracted a greater percentage of enrollment decisions. In contrast to the
prevailing trend in the literature, Parker and Summers (1993) did not fmd a significant
effect of financial aid on enrollment decisions by accepted applicants. The selective
nature and perceived quality of the included colleges may have led to enrollment
regardless of financial aid, though Kim (2010) also suggested the limited timeframe may
have produced this result. Though published in 1993, Heller (1997) did not include this
study.
Buss, Parker, and Rivenburg (2004) expanded the timeframe considered by
Parker and Summers (1993) in a study of 102 selective liberal arts colleges from 1988 to
1998. This study found a significant effect of both grants and loans on enrollment
decisions with grants (0.31) more effective than loans (0.12). Buss et al. (2004) also
found aid recipients (1.27) were twice as sensitive to price as full-pay students (0.60).
According to those figures, demand was inelastic among full-pay students and elastic
among aided students. This result is particularly noteworthy to the dissertation at hand,
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which considers the relationship of price elasticity of full-pay and aided students to
unfunded institutional aid.
Buss et al.. (2004) then applied their findings to Benchmark College, a fictional
institution with a total price of $17,500. Benchmark must admit 1,000 full-pay students
to enroll its target of 250 (25% yield) and 625 aided students (40% yield) with an average
financial aid package of $7,500 in grants and $3,000 in loans to enroll its target of 250
(500 total entering students). If Benchmark were to raise tuition by $1,000, it would
enroll 10 less full-pay students and 17 fewer aided students. In order to reach the
enrollment target of 250 of each type of student without adjusting financial aid awards,
Benchmark must admit 43 more full-pay and 45 more aided applicants. If Benchmark
merely raised financial aid packages by an equal percentage as the $1,000 tuition hike
(5.7%), it would still have to admit 29 more aided students to reach the enrollment goal.
The hypothetical example of Benchmark College provided by Buss et al. (2004)
demonstrates how changes in tuition price affect both financial aid and selectivity, which
relates directly to Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college. Desired enrollment
level and price are linked in the model. As price increases, enrollment declines without
additional effort to recruit potential students or accepting more applicants than previous
quality standards allowed.
In a study of a private, church-affiliated college from 1959 to 1993, Allen and

Shen (1999) calculated a net price elasticity of 1.53, which indicates elastic demand.
Allen and Shen (1999) also found a cross-price elasticity of 1.09 with another private
comprehensive college in the region, indicating that prospective students viewed this
institution as a comparable substitute and were sensitive to its prices as well. Neither a
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neighboring public regional university nor a public doctoral university were viewed as a
comparable substitute based on cross-price elasticity. Allen and Shen's (1999) results
demonstrated the possible difference in elasticity between an individual institution and
the prevailing inelastic demand for higher education overall as well as the price
competition among comparable institutions.
Hsing and Chang (1996) studied enrollments at private colleges and universities
from 1964 to 1991, finding that price elasticity doubled from 0.261 to 0.557 during the
period. This finding suggests that prospective students became increasingly sensitive to
price over time. Kim (20 10) was critical of this study's lack of consideration of financial
aid, though Hsing and Chang suggested the result could point to public institutions being
increasingly considered comparable substitutes for a private college or university.
Beyond the work focusing on private colleges, DesJardins et al. (2006) found
"students who receive less aid than expected were less likely to enroll than students who
receive aid in excess of their expectations" in a study of admissions data from the
University oflowa from 1997 to 2002 (p. 412). This finding adds another level of
consideration in institutional financial aid. Whereas other studies identify fmancial aid
factors encouraging enrollment, DesJardins et al. (2006) demonstrated that merely
disappointing expectations of financial aid can actually discourage enrollment.
These studies demonstrate the importance of price and financial aid to enrollment
at private liberal arts colleges, which is particularly relevant to this dissertation on private
baccalaureate colleges (Kim, 2010). Like Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Kim (2010)
encouraged an institution to consider its individual price elasticity when setting tuition
and financial aid policies. Kim (2010) concluded, "To survive in this competitive higher
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education market, institutions should actively utilize price mechanisms to recruit students
with higher academic credentials and increase their institutional net revenues" (p. 42).
This statement is a direct endorsement of tuition discounting, though the goals of
increasing quality and increasing revenue can conflict (Archibald & Feldman, 2008).
Other studies.
The work of Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Heller (1997), and Kim (2010) provide
a thorough review of studies examining the effect of financial aid on enrollment. Three
additional studies not included in those works offer strong contributions to understanding
the relationship of financial aid and enrollment decisions. Two of the studies analyzed
data from large, public universities and one considered demand elasticity among enrolled
students at a private college.
In a study of admissions data from the University of Oregon from 2000 to 2005,
Curs and Singell (20 10) found price responsiveness varied based on ability and need
groupings. Less able students with more need were less responsive to price than more
qualified students of means. Though the data comes from a very different institution than
the focus of this dissertation, the differences in price responsiveness among groups based
on means and qualification is noteworthy. The finding that highly qualified, wealthy
students are most sensitive to price illustrates the competition within higher education for
this group. These students have, and are aware of, options for enrollment.
Singell and Stone (2002) also examined University of Oregon admissions data,
but from an earlier period (1995 to 2000). This study found non-need-based fmancial aid
encouraged enrollment in the university, particularly among students of means compared
to students with need. This fmding supports the rationale for providing discounted tuition
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to students of means. Singell and Stone's (2002) study suggested providing these aid
packages encourages enrollment of students capable of paying a higher percentage of
published tuition thereby boosting an institution's net tuition revenue.
Previous reviews noted that price elasticity studies tend to focus on enrolling
freshmen, who are expected to be more sensitive to price than enrolled students (Heller,
1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Bryan and Whipple (1995) found this to be true when
analyzing data from a private liberal arts college. Current students demonstrated
sufficiently inelastic demand to allow for increased tuition without reducing enrollment.
Bryan and Whipple's (1995) model predicted up to a 16.9% tuition increase would not
adversely affect the existing enrollment. This finding suggests private baccalaureate
colleges can raise tuition in the attempt to maximize net tuition revenue without losing
enrolled students. This fmding also supports the discount rates in NACUBO (20 11 ),
which reported that discounting is lower among all students than first-time, full-time
undergraduates (see Figure 2). In combination, NACUBO (2011) and Bryan and
Whipple ( 1995) suggest a college should be most concerned with the price elasticity of
incoming rather than existing students when setting tuition price.
Models of Student Choice

DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2006) thoroughly reviewed the literature
related to modeling student choice. In sum, DesJardins et al. (2006) found most models
use a three-stage process of aspiration, search, and choice (Davis-Van Atta & Carrier,
1986; Hanson & Litten, 1982; Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989; Hossler &
Gallagher, 1987; Jackson, 1982).
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In the first stage, a student develops the general aspiration to attend college.
These aspirations can begin in early childhood, develop over an extended period, and
culminate in the selection of high school courses preparing the student for college
enrollment. In order to enroll in a college, a student must first desire to attend higher
education and lay the groundwork for a successful application. In the second stage, a
student searches for colleges to possibly attend, including identification and application
to college(s). During this stage, the student gathers information from a variety of formal
and informal sources, takes appropriate tests such as the SAT, and applies to college(s).
In the third stage, a student chooses a college in which to enroll. This stage includes
admission and enrollment in a specific college. As DesJardins et al. (2006) noted, most
enrollment demand studies focus in this area, which can neglect the early phases of the
student's choice. In addressing matriculation decisions, Nurnberg, Schapiro, and
Zimmerman (2010) offered a model that includes personal preference as a component.
This preference factor acknowledges the individual nature of enrollment decisions.
The enrollment studies previously cited and the student choice models reviewed
by DesJardins et al. (2006) generally examined enrollment choices through aggregate
data, however, these college decisions are highly individualized. Prospective students do
not always choose a college based on rational economic factors (Heller, 1997). As
Numberg et al. (20 10) concluded,
.. .it should be noted that even with the presence of an extensive range of
explanatory variables, much of the total variation in matriculation decisions
remains unexplained. Perhaps it is the weather on preview day, or the
attractiveness of the tour guide that attracts or repels a prospective student. (p. 22)
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Beyond the weather or a tour guide's appearance, a myriad of factors could possibly
influence the personal preference of a prospective student. It is beyond the scope of this
study to engage the individual nature of enrollment decisions, though this nature must be
acknowledged.
Tuition Discounting in Higher Education

The literature directly focused on tuition discounting is organized into two
categories: general tuition discounting studies and tuition discounting outcomes/effects
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Within general tuition discounting studies, much of the work centers
on the annual NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey. The literature on outcomes and
effects of tuition discounting, in comparison, represents an array of sampling, data
sources, and lines of research.
General Tuition Discounting Literature

The general literature on tuition discounting focused on reporting discount rate
trends. The annual NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey is a common source for many
of the studies, though the College Board published an independent report in 2010 (Baum
et al., 201 0). Each report relied on compiled responses to separate surveys. Though
reporting similar results in general, differences arise based on the particular dataset.
The NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey.

The National Association of College and University Business Officers annually
surveys member institutions on tuition discounting and institutional aid. In 2010, the
survey drew viable responses from 381 private colleges and universities (NACUBO,
2011). The report analyzed the total sample as well as three subcategories: small
institutions, defined as those with enrollments less than 4,000 students and generally
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awarding bachelor's and master's degrees; comprehensive/doctoral institutions, defined
as those with enrollments greater than 4,000 students granting master's and possibly
doctoral degrees; and research universities, defined as "doctoral degree granting research
universities" (NACUBO, 2011, p. 24). Of the total2010 sample, small institutions
comprised 79.5%, comprehensive/doctoral institutions comprised 12.9%, and research
universities comprised 7.6%. By Carnegie classification, special focus institutions
represent only 5.5% of the NACUBO sample compared to 36.0% of all private, not-forprofit institutions (NACUBO, 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2011b).
Baccalaureate colleges (44.9% of the sample versus 33.3% of the population), master's
institutions (36.3% versus 23.8%), and doctoral research universities (13.4% versus
6.8%) were, therefore, overrepresented in the NACUBO sample compared to the
population.
The number ofNACUBO respondents increased every year since 2000, more than
doubling the sample size from 154 responding institutions to 381 in 2010. Even with the
growth in response numbers, the sample size leaves room for critique. Duggan and
Matthews (2005) described the NACUBO reports as "interesting as an overview of
tuition discounting," but "oflimited utility'' based on the sample size (p. 45). In 2005,
roughly 19% of the more than 1,800 private four-year institutions listed in Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) participated in the NACUBO survey.
Duggan and Matthews (2005) advocated using the more comprehensive data available
through IPEDS to analyze and compare tuition discount rates. IPEDS can also provide
continuous data for an institution over a number of years, whereas the NACUBO survey
readily acknowledged attrition as an issue. Within the NACUBO sample, only 143
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institutions (37.5% of2010 sample) provided three consecutive years of response data
with just 94 (24.8% of2010 sample) responding for 10 consecutive years.
Another limitation of the NACUBO survey is the reporting of a single discounting
rate, the scholarship allowance, without distinguishing between funded and unfunded
institutional aid. The scholarship allowance, called the average discount rate in the
NACUBO report, is calculated as total institutional grants (both funded and unfunded
aid) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees (Allan, 2007). Unfunded aid represents
the greatest concern to colleges and universities, yet little effort was made to distinguish
this type of aid in the NACUBO report (Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004).
Despite these limitations, the NACUBO survey is helpful as a general tool to
track movements in discount rates, institutional fmancial aid, and net tuition revenue. In
2010, the average discount rate to first-time, full-time freshmen (42.4%) and all
undergraduates (37.1 %) reached unprecedented levels. The percentage of enrolling
students receiving institutional aid jumped substantially from 2008 to 2009, which
NACUBO attributed to the economic recession. This percentage was expected to hold
steady in 2010. After a small decline in 2008 (-0.3%), the responding institutions saw
modest gains in net tuition revenue in 2009 (1.8%) and 2010 (2.8%) despite the increases
in discount rates.
Figure 9 shows the average discount rates for first-time, full-time freshmen by
institutional type from 2000 to 2010 according to the NACUBO survey results. Clearly
small institutions, which discounted tuition by 43.7% in 2010, offered greater discounts
than comprehensive/doctoral institutions (36.6%) or research universities (38.7%). This
relationship has been consistent for more than a decade.
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Figure 9. Average discount rates to first-time, full-time freshmen by institutional type,
2000-2010. Adapted from the 2010 Tuition Discounting Study Report by the National
Association of College and University Business Officers, 2011.
Figure 10 shows the percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen receiving
institutional grants by institutional type from 2000 to 2010 according to the NACUBO
survey results. Again, small institutions clearly awarded institutional aid to a higher
percentage of enrolling students than the other categories. In 2010, more than 90% of
enrolling students received institutional aid at small institutions. The NACUBO study
did not directly distinguish between funded and unfunded aid in these financial aid
packages.
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Figure 10. Percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen receiving institutional grants by
institutional type, 2000-2010. Adapted from the 2010 Tuition Discounting Study Report
by the National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2011.
Analyses Related to the NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study.

NACUBO first began the tuition discounting study in 1994. At that time, concern
was growing over increasing discount rates. Jenny (1997) argued that discounts should
be offered to maximize net tuition revenue, but warned that providing institutional grants
to more than half of enrolling students signals a point of no return. Once 7 5% or more of
students receive institutional aid, the process becomes self-defeating (Jenny (1997). The
average percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen at small institutions receiving
institutional aid was more than 90% in 2010 (NACUBO, 2011). The number of colleges
providing institutional aid to the overwhelming majority of incoming freshmen increased
dramatically since the start of the NACUBO survey. In 1990, just more than 14% of
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respondents provided aid to more than 90% of incoming freshmen. By 1999, this
percentage increased to 43.3% of respondents (Lapovsky & Hubbell, 2000).
In an analysis of the 1998 NACUBO study, Lapovsky (1999) found only two
respondents, or 0.5% of the sample, reported net tuition revenues equal to published
tuition, meaning these institutions offered no discounts. In considering changes to tuition
price, Lapovsky (1999) reported five of the six colleges cutting tuition between 1997 and
1998 suffered a drop in net tuition revenue. At institutions increasing tuition from 1997
to 1998, nearly a quarter reported less net tuition revenue. These declines suggest these
institutions had price elasticities greater than one, a situation requiring more institutional
aid be distributed when tuition rises merely to meet enrolment goals. Overall,
Lapovsky's (1999) fmdings were consistent with other work in the literature, namely
Leslie and Brinkman (1987). Colleges considering cutting tuition should exercise great
care and anticipate a period of reduced tuition revenues during implementation. Colleges
considering raising tuition should monitor individual price elasticity to ensure such a
move will not lead to a net tuition revenue decline.
Institutions with low to moderate endowment values must increasingly offer
greater tuition discounts to meet enrollment goals. Endowment value is highly correlated
with top U.S. News & World Report rankings and higher tuition (Hubbell & Lapovsky,
2005). As suggested by the Chivas Regal effect, the demand for these institutions
requires less financial aid to meet enrollment goals. In 2000, Lapovsky and Hubbell
noted institutions with endowments greater than $100 million offer less institutional aid.
The situation is one "in which institutional wealth begets institutional wealth with overall
lower rates of discount, fewer students aided, and higher average aid levels offsetting
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higher tuition levels for the aided students" (Hubbell & Lapovsky, 2005, "Prestige and
Money Matter," para. 1). As a result, colleges with aspirations beyond their wealth are
squeezed. In 2005, the highest tuition discount rates (40.1%) were at institutions with
endowments from $10.1 million to $25 million. Similar discount rates are listed for
endowment values ranging from $25.1 million to $50 million (39.1 %), $50.1 million to
$100 million (38.8%), and $101 million to $500 million (38.1%). The poorest (32.7%)
and wealthiest institutions (34.5%) in terms of endowment discounted tuition the least
(Hubbell & Lapovsky, 2005). In sum, Lapovsky and Hubbell (2000) and Hubbell and
Lapovsky (2005) supported the existence of a Chivas Regal effect among selective,
wealthy institutions, but find that colleges aspiring to that status must provide greater
levels of financial aid to meet enrollment goals.
The 2010 College Board Tuition Discounting Study.

In a 2010 report, Baum et al. analyzed institutional data reported directly to the
College Board from 2000 to 2009 through its Annual Survey of Colleges. At least 474
private, four-year institutions responded in any year with an average of 687 in each year
of the nine-year period. The College Board sample is substantially larger than the
number of respondents to the NACUBO survey. Baum et al. (20 10), like the NACUBO
report, defined the tuition discount rate as the scholarship allowance, which is total
institutional grants divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees (Allan, 2007). In
addition to the larger sample, another advantage of this report is the more nuanced data
provided to the College Board, allowing for more analysis of discounting within various
categories.
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Table 3
Discount Rates by Institutional Category (in %), 2007-2008
Percentile
Mean

lOth

25th

Median

75th

90th

Public, Two-Year

12.6

0.7

2.6

7.4

17.6

27.7

Public, Four-Year

17.6

4.0

9.0

15.6

24.4

33.6

Private, Four-Year

32.8

17.6

24.8

33.6

41.1

47.0

Note. Adapted from Tuition Discounting: Institutional Aid Patterns at Public and
Private Colleges and Universities, 2000-2001 to 2008-2009 by Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma,
2010, p. 6.
Table 3 shows the differences in discount rates for the 2007-2008 academic year.
Baum et al. (20 10) found that discount rates for public institutions were relatively stable
from 2000 to 2009. Discount rates at private institutions continued to rise during the
period and were substantially greater than either public two-year or four-year institutions.
Baum et al. 's (2010) analysis of discount rates by tuition quartiles echoed the
discounting squeeze by endowment noted in Hubbell and Lapovsky (2005). In the 20072008 academic year, the least expensive institutions (fourth quartile) also discounted the
least (25.3%). Though the top three quartiles discount within a relatively small range, the
third quartile discounts the most (34.2%) followed by the second quartile (33.8%) and the
highest quartile (32.6%). Price elasticity likely accounts for at least some of this squeeze,
as institutions in the second and third quartile likely face more elastic demand than the
most expensive quartile. Those institutions must then provide greater discounts to meet
enrollment goals.
Baum et al. (2010) found different results than Hubbell and Lapovsky (2005) in
regard to the relationship of endowment value to discount rate. Whereas Hubbell and
Lapovsky (2005) analyzed discount rates based on the total endowment value, Baum et
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al. (2010) used endowment per full-time equivalent (FTE). Using this method, discount
rates are highest at institutions with $500,000 or more in endowment per FTE at 36.8% in
the 2007-2008 academic year. Though institutions with $50,000 to $199,999 in
endowment per FTE (34.4%) discounted slightly more than those with $200,000 to
$499,999 in endowment per FTE (34.0%), discount rates generally increased along with
endowment per FTE. This finding suggests that wealthier institutions are more capable
of offering tuition discounts, possibly through the availability of more funded
institutional aid. Baum et al. (2010) noted a close correlation of endowment value per
FTE and published tuition price, so the possibility exists that less endowed institutions
reach a net price comparable to the wealthiest institutions despite lower discount rates.
Other fmdings applicable to this dissertation include that baccalaureate colleges
discounted at higher rates than master's or doctoral-granting institutions and discount
rates peak at institutions with middling SAT scores (1100 to 1149) while declining at
institutions with higher average scores (Baum et al., 2010). In regard to SAT scores,
Baum et al. (20 10) supported the conclusion that colleges in the middle must discount
more to attract students.
Overall, the Baum et al. (2010) report is likely more accurate than NACUBO
(2011) as it is based on a much larger sample size. The advantage ofthe NACUBO
survey is annual reports with historical data for nearly two decades. The Duggan and
Matthews (2005) critique of the NACUBO survey also applies to Baum et al. (2010). A
common disadvantage of both the NACUBO survey and Baum et al. (2010) is the limited
reporting of unfunded institutional discount rate, which represents foregone tuition
revenue and is of greater concern to colleges than the funded institutional discount rate
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(Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004). Using !PEDS data, as in this dissertation, allows
analysis of discount rates of the entire population of targeted institutions as well as the
ability to distinguish between funded and unfunded institutional aid.
Outcomes and Effects of Tuition Discounting
In a study of tuition discounting in the aggregate and on the institutional level,
Davis (2003) found discounting tuition included several unintended consequences,
including reducing affordability and choice of low-income students. From 1995 to 1999,
institutional aid more than doubled for the wealthiest students at private colleges and
universities compared to more modest gains for less wealthy students. The percentage of
institutional aid awarded to students whose families earn $40,000 or less declined by
16.0% during this period (Davis, 2003). Acknowledging discounting may yield positive
results at individual institutions, Davis (2003) found discounting tuition often results in
less net tuition revenue and minimal, if any, gains in average SAT scores. This finding
suggests that institutions may be discounting merely to reach the desired enrollment
level, a stage one decision in Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college.
Redd (2000) reached similar conclusions to Davis (2003). Institutions increasing
grants the most from 1989 to 1996 faced declining tuition revenue. From 1990 to 1998,
the average SAT scores at institutions with the greatest increases in discount rates grew
less than at institutions with the least increases. In combination, Davis (2003) and Redd
(2000) suggested that tuition discounts may actually harm the student profile and net
tuition revenue of an institution. Neither study focused on institutional demand and its
effect on discounting, which limits the analysis to a more general level.
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In a study of baccalaureate colleges in Pennsylvania, Griffith (1996) found
colleges with the lowest discount rates reaped the greatest gains in net tuition revenue as
well as the greatest gains in enrollment from 1987 to 1993. This study did consider price
elasticity of demand, concluding elastic demand resulted in the lower net tuition revenue.
Griffith (1996) concluded increasing discount rates can erode the financial health of a
college, a fmding supported by Browning (2011). In analyzing the relationship of
discounting to fmancial stability as measured by financial ratios not considering
endowment value, Browning (2011) found less financially stable institutions discounted
more than other more stable peers, indicating a college struggling financially may
compound its difficulties through excessive discounting. This dissertation builds on these
studies by examining the relationship of price elasticity to unfunded institutional aid.
Ruterbusch (2004) examined tuition discounting at private baccalaureate colleges
between 1990 and 2000, finding discounting increased for this population by seven
percentage points in the decade, smaller and less prestigious colleges discounted the
most, and tuition discounting negatively affected net tuition revenue. These findings are
highly relevant to this study since the population is generally the same. Though the
targeted institutions are similar, this study differs in the focus of analysis by examining
the relationship of price elasticity of demand, which was not a component of
Ruterbusch's (2004) study, on unfunded institutional aid. This dissertation also examines
more recent data. As Ruterbusch (2004) acknowledged, a change in the IPEDS reporting
definition in 1997 appeared to confuse colleges, possibly affecting the accuracy of the
reported data. Whereas this change fell in the middle of study period for Ruterbusch
(2004), this dissertation should benefit from consistent reporting requests from 2000 to
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2009. Despite different foci of analysis, this dissertation shares a common target
population with Ruterbusch (2004) and benefits from data expected to be more reliably
accurate in the reporting done to IPEDS by the individual institutions.
Summary
Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college holds that institutions make
enrollment decisions in two stages. The first stage establishes an operational pattern
based on desired enrollment, fixed inputs to support the enrollment, and tuition price
necessary to support the enrollment. The second stage seeks to maximize both student
quality and the quality of the fixed inputs. Tuition discounting decisions can be made in
either of these stages based on the demand for enrollment.
Price and cost are inextricably linked in higher education. Two theories, cost
disease theory and the revenue theory of costs, explain the continually rising costs in
higher education. According to cost disease, the wages for skilled labor rise in response
to inflation in the general economy, an external force, rather than gains in productivity
(Baumol & Bowen, 1966). Subsequent studies found evidence that the cost of skilled
labor in higher education drove the spiraling tuition rates (Archibald & Feldman, 2008;
Trombella, 2011 ). According to the revenue theory of costs, the rising costs in higher
education result from an insatiable institutional desire for more funds, an internal force.
Available revenue is, therefore, the only constraint on spending (Bowen, 1980). An
analysis of siniultaneous growth in external financial aid and tuition rates supported the
revenue theory of costs (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ).
Pricing tuition is also a strategy unto itself. Two contrasting models, high tuitionhigh aid and low tuition-low aid, are most frequently used (Hillman, 2010). In both,
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tuition and financial aid are established in an effort to provide sufficient net tuition
revenue to cover an institution's expenses. The Chivas Regal effect supports higher
tuition since price is associated with quality (Martin, 2011). Colleges adopting a low
tuition-low aid model have found mixed results, suggesting the outcomes are based on
individual circumstances.
The literature on enrollment holds that demand for higher education is generally
inelastic, though an individual institution should monitor its own elasticity in making
pricing and financial aid decisions (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A number of studies
concluded financial aid encouraged enrollment on both an aggregate and institutional
basis. Financial aid packages can be used as a tool to encourage enrollment, a
fundamental premise of discounting tuition.
Studies of tuition discounting found its consequences can be, and often are,
negative, including reduced net tuition revenue, limited gains in student quality, and
limited gains in enrollment. These studies generally reported the scholarship allowance,
which considers all institutional aid and overlooks the particular concern to colleges
posed by unfunded institutional aid. Studies based on independent surveys also limit
generalizability by not using the more comprehensive data available through IPEDS.
This dissertation builds on the existing literature by focusing on the relationship
of price elasticity of demand to unfunded institutional aid, a topic yet to be examined.
Previous studies suggest that more elastic demand should increase the levels of unfunded
institutional aid. If such a relationship is found, it suggests that tuition discounting
reflects increasingly elastic demand for private baccalaureate colleges, which holds
greater consequences on institutional financial health than lost net revenue in a given
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year. Using the comprehensive IPEDS dataset, the sample under study closely
approximates a population study.

Chapter Three: Methodology
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. This chapter describes the quantitative
methodology applied in this pursuit. Multiple regressions will be used to examine the
relationship of price elasticity for full-pay and aided students to unfunded institutional
discounts. Repeated measures analyses of variance will be used to examine changes in
the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional aid at private baccalaureate colleges during
the period.
Research Questions
This study seeks to address the overarching question: What are the implications of
unfunded institutional discount rates on institutional market strength at private
baccalaureate colleges between 2000 and 2009? The following research sub-questions
are pursued as well:
1. What is the relationship of the tuition price elasticity of demand for full-pay and aided
students to the unfunded institutional discount rate?
The research hypothesis (H 1) is: Elastic demand by either or both full-pay and
aided students is significantly related to the unfunded institutional discount rate. The
accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is: No statistically significant relationship exists
between elastic demand by either full-pay or aided students and unfunded institutional
discount rate.
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2. Given the outcome of Question 1, what is the relationship of the price elasticity of
demand for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate
based on admissions selectivity?
The research hypothesis (H2) is: The relationship of elastic demand by either or
both full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate differs
significantly based on admissions selectivity. The accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is:
There is no statistically significant difference based on admissions selectivity in the
relationship of elastic demand by either or both full-pay and aided students to the
unfunded institutional discount rate.
3. How, if at all, has the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates?
The research hypothesis (H3) is: A significant change in the ratio of funded and
unfunded institutional discount rates followed the economic recession from 2007 to 2009.
The accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is: There is no significant change in the ratio of
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from
2007 to 2009.
4. Given the outcome of Question 3, how, if at all, has the economic recession from
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on
endowment?
The research hypothesis (Ii4) is: The change in the ratio of funded and unfunded
institutional discount rates following the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 differs
significantly based on endowment value. The accompanying null hypothesis (Ho) is:
There is no significant difference based on endowment value in the shift in the ratio of
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funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from
2007 to 2009.
Selection of Quantitative Methodology
Quantitative research is appropriate to examine relationships among numerical
variables (Creswell, 2009). In particular, this methodology is appropriate when questions
involve investigation into understanding how and to what extent variables impact
outcomes. This study examines relationships among numerical variables at multiple
private baccalaureate colleges over a 10-year period, so quantitative methodology is
appropriate. Much of the research reviewed in chapter two applied similar approaches.
Thus, applying quantitative analyses in this study helps to place it within the existing
literature.
Study Population and Sample
This study focuses on private baccalaureate colleges, defmed as private, not-forprofit, four-year institutions in the United States classified as baccalaureate by the
Carnegie Foundation with exclusively undergraduate enrollment. The following steps
were taken to identify the sample for analysis:
1. Institutional control or affiliation reported to IPEDS as either "private, not-forprofit (no religious affiliation)" or "private, not-for-profit (religious affiliation)"
were included. In the !PEDS variable (ic2010.cntlaffi:VL-Institutional control or
affiliation), institutions reporting values of"3" or "4" were included.
2. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2010 reported to !PEDS as either
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse
Fields" were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.ccbasic:VL-Carnegie
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Classification 2010: Basic), institutions reporting values of "21" or "22" were
included.
3. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2005 reported to !PEDS as either
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse
Fields" were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2009_ ccbasic: VL-Camegie
Classification 2005: Basic), institutions reporting values of "21" or "22" were
included.
4. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2000 reported to !PEDS as either
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Liberal Arts" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--General"
were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.carnegie:VL-Carnegie
Classification 2000), institutions reporting values of "31" or "32" were included.
Requiring a designation as a baccalaureate college in 2000,2005, and 2010
ensured an institution maintained the same Carnegie classification throughout the
period of analysis.
5. Enrollment profiles reported to !PEDS as "Exclusively undergraduate four-year"
were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.ccenrprf:VL-Carnegie
Classification 2010: Enrollment Profile), institutions reporting values of"2" were
included.
A total of 178 colleges met these criteria for inclusion in the study. Following the
. methodology ofRuterbusch (2004), colleges reporting zero dollars of unfunded
institutional aid were removed from the sample. In such cases, the college either does not
engage in tuition discounting through unfunded institutional aid or a repeated
error/omission occurred in reporting. For this study, all colleges reporting zero dollars of
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unfunded institutional aid in three or more of the 10 years in the period under study were
eliminated from the sample. Applying this criterion eliminated 29 colleges, leaving a
total of 149 remaining in the sample. In a limited review of the eliminated colleges based
on endowment value and funded institutional aid, it appears a handful may not award
unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value and the reported amount of funded
institutional aid. The majority appear more likely to have erred or omitted data in
reporting. In Appendix A, Table A1 lists the colleges included in the sample. Table A2
lists the colleges removed and the reason(s) for removal.
Within the 149 colleges remaining in the sample, a total of 14 reported zero
dollars of unfunded institutional aid in one (nine colleges) or two (five colleges) of the
years included in the 10-year period of analysis. In these cases, the zero value was
deemed a reporting error, replaced with"." as a placeholder value, and treated as missing
data. The corresponding year's funded aid was also eliminated in these instances. For 11
of these 14 colleges, the reported funded aid in the year missing unfunded aid was greater
than the adjacent year(s), including six colleges for which the reported funded aid was
double the adjacent years. Eliminating the funded aid data, which appears to be
erroneously reported, in these years ensures that the entire data year will be treated as
missing data and not be included in the analysis.
One fmal check was run to reduce the likelihood of including erroneously
reported institutional data in the final dataset. The reported unfunded institutional aid
was compared to the following year to identify instances in which the figure varied by
more than 50%. Only two instances, representing 0.1% of the examined data points,
were identified. In both instances, the amount of unfunded aid increased by more than
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50% in the following year, establishing a new level that continued in subsequent years for
those institutions.

Data Sources
All variables in the dataset were taken from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (!PEDS), or derived from calculations performed with !PEDS
variables. Administered by the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for
Educational Statistics, !PEDS houses data gathered through a number of annual surveys
for more than 6,700 institutions (U.S. Department of Education, 2011a). All institutions
of higher education participating in federal student aid programs must report data on
enrollments, finances, student financial aid, and tuition prices among other topical areas
(U.S. Department ofEducation, 2011a).

Limitations of the Data
The data reported to !PEDS is unaudited, which leaves open the possibility of
errors in reporting or even deliberate deception by an institution (Griffith, 1996; Stump,
2001 ). The possibility of misunderstanding the exact data requested can lead to reporting
errors in institutional submissions, particularly if a change in definition occurred
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Unlike Ruterbusch (2004), definitions of institutional fmancial aid
remained constant during this study's period of analysis, reducing the risk of
misunderstanding on the part of institutional researchers reporting data.
There are, however, reasons to be confident in the accuracy of !PEDS data.
During data entry by the individual institutions, the system runs a number of error checks,
including comparing entries across years and to the same request made in different
sections (U.S. Department of Education, 2011a). Before locking any survey section, the
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institutional researcher submitting data must respond to the error report generated by the
institution. The person entering the data is asked to correct, confirm, or explain
incongruent data before the system will lock the submission. Without addressing all
errors in all section of the survey, resulting in a clean report, the competed survey cannot
be submitted.
Beyond the data checks during submission, comparative analysis with other
datasets supports the accuracy of IPEDS. In a study using data from IPEDS, the U.S.
News & World Report annual survey, the American Association of University Professors

annual survey, citation indices from the Institute for Scientific Information, and data from
various college guidebooks, Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) found the IPEDS data to be
"highly correlated" to other sources (p. 137). Schuh (2002) described IPEDS data as "a
more readily accessible and comprehensive approach to accessing institutional
data ... than other methods of data collection (pp. 29-30). Though the limitations of any
unaudited, self-reported data must be acknowledged, IPEDS data is the foundation of this
study and is arguably a vetted and valued source of data.
The method of reporting of student fmancial aid also limits the dataset. IPEDS
gathers the number of first-time, full-time undergraduates in a given year's fmancial aid
cohort. As such, the calculations of price elasticity in this dissertation study are limited
to enrolling freshmen. As Leslie and Brinkman (1987) noted, examining only enrolling
freshmen can inflate the elasticity values. The bulk of studies on student price
responsiveness share this limitation by focusing on enrolling traditional college-age
students.
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A final limitation of the data is the number of years available for certain variables.
In an attempt to respond to the adapting needs for higher education data, IPEDS adds,

and sometimes removes, the request for certain data from year to year. This dissertation
study is directly limited by the availability of admissions data from 2001 to 2009 and the
availability of endowment data from 2003 to 2009. Questions involving these variables
must be adapted to reflect the data available.
Description of Variables
Table 4 below describes the variables analyzed in this study. All variables in the
dataset were either taken directly from the IPEDS or derived from calculations with
IPEDS variables.
The calculation of price elasticity requires further explanation. As presented in
chapter two, price elasticity (PE) measures "the responsiveness of demand to changes in
price" (Arnold, 2008, p. 377). It is calculated as the ratio of percent change in quantity
demanded (Qd) to percent change in price (P), or:
PE =

% change in quantity demanded
% change in price

In calculating price elasticities for full-pay and aided students, directly calculating the

percentage change is ineffective due to fluctuations in enrollments (Hall & Lieberman,
2006). These fluctuations do not necessarily indicate a change in demand, but do alter
the outcome of this simplest calculation. Breneman's (1994) theory noted this possibility
as enrollments vary within an acceptable range between lower and upper limits.
In 1967, Campbell and Siegel used the ratio of enrolled students to the eligible

population in their estimates of price response in higher education. Jackson and
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Weathersby (1975) included that ratio in calculating price elasticity for higher education
by the following formula:
A(E /P}

PE=

(E/P)
AC

c

where E is the enrollment, P is the eligible population, and C is the cost to students
(tuition price).
Applying the Jackson and Weathersby (1975) formula to this dissertation study,
price elasticity for full-pay students (XFP) is calculated as follows:
A(XFP /E)
(Xpp/E)
AP

p
where E stands for the college's enrolling cohort of students and P stands for the tuition
price. The same formula is applied to calculate price elasticity for aided, or partial-pay,
students (Xpp) with the substitution ofXpp for Xpp. This calculation controls for
fluctuations in enrollment by considering the proportion of full-pay and aided students
within the enrolling cohort rather than the absolute numbers.
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Table 4
Description of Variables

Variable

Source/Calculation

Year

IPEDS (year), value from 1999 to 2009

Institution

IPEDS (instnm)

PTE
Enrollment

IPEDS (drvefYEAR_fte:VL-Full-time equivalent fall enrollment)

Full-Pay
Students
(XFP)

Calculation: sfaYEAR.scugffn - sfaYEAR.igmt_n
Included Variables: IPEDS (sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of fulltime first-time degree/certificate seeking undergraduates), IPEDS
(sfaYEAR.igmt_n:vl-number of full-time first-time undergraduates
receiving institutional grant aid)

Aided
Students
(Xpp)

IPEDS (sfaYEAR.igmt_n:vl-number of full-time first-time
undergraduates receiving institutional grant aid)

Tuition and
Fees (P)

Calculation: sfaYEAR.scugffn + icYEAR_ay_fee3
Included Variables: IPEDS (icYEAR_ay.tuition3:vl-out-of-state average
tuition for full-time undergraduates), IPEDS (icYEAR_ay_fee3:vl-out-ofstate undergraduate required fees)

Average
Aided
Tuition (Paid)

IPEDS (sfaYEAR.npgrn2:VL-Average net price-students receiving grant
or scholarship aid- YEAR)

Price
Elasticity
(Full-Pay)

Calculation: [((XFPyear2 I Eyear2)- (XFPyearl I Eyeart)) I (XFPyearl I Eyeart)] I
((Pyear2- Pyeart) I Pyeart)
Included Variables: full-pay students, tuition and fees, IPEDS
(sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of full-time first-time
degree/certificate seeking undergraduates)

Price
Elasticity
(Aided)

Calculation: [((XPPyear2/ Eyear2)- (XPPyearl I Eyeart)) I (XPPyearl I Eyeart)] I
((Paid..year2 -Paid..yearI)/ Paid.year2)
Included Variables: Aided students, average aided tuition, IPEDS
(sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of full-time first-time
degree/certificate seeking undergraduates)
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Table 4 Cont' d

Variable

Source/Calculation

Unfunded
Institutional
Discount
Rate

Calculation: [fYEAR_f2.f2c06/ (fYEAR_f2.f2d01 + fYEAR_f2.f2c08)]
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2c06:vl-institutional grants
(unfunded)), !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2d01:vl-tuition and fees- total), !PEDS
(fYEAR_f2.f2c08:vl-allowances applied to tuition and fees)

Funded
Institutional
Discount
Rate

Calculation: [fYEAR_ f2.f2c05 I (fYEAR_f2.f2d01 + fYEAR_f2.f2c08)]
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR_ f2.f2c05:vl-institutional grants
(funded)), !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2d01:vl-tuition and fees- total), !PEDS
(fYEAR_f2.f2c08:vl-allowances applied to tuition and fees)

Admission
Rate

Calculation: icYEAR.admssn I icYEAR.applcn
Included Variables: !PEDS (icYEAR.applcn:VL-Applicants total), !PEDS
(icYEAR.admssn:VL-Admissions total)

Endowment
Value per
FTE

Quartile Rank (derived from the calculation below)
Calculation: A VERAGE[(f0405_f2.f2h01 I drvef0405.fte),
(f0506_f2.f2h01 I drvef0506.fte), (f0607_f2.f2h01 I drvef0607.fte),
(f0708_t2.t2h011 drvef0708.fte), (f0809_t2.t2h01/ drvef0809.fte)
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR f2.f2h01 :vi-value of endowment
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year), !PEDS (drvefYEAR.fte:VLFull-time equivalent fall enrollment)

All four research questions consider variables over a 10-year period from 2000 to
2009. In order to calculate the necessary variables in 2000, data from 1999 is used as a
base year. Question 1 considers three variables: unfunded institutional discount rate,
price elasticity of full-pay students, and price elasticity of aided students. Question 2
considers the same three variables as Question 1 with the addition of admission
selectivity. Question 3 considers two variables: funded institutional discount rate and
unfunded institutional discount rate. Question 4 considers the same two variables as
Question 3 as well as the variable for endowment per full-time equivalent. Table 5 shows
the variables used in each question.
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Table 5

Included Variables by Question
Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Unfunded institutional discount rate (1,2,3,4)
Price Elasticity of Full-Pay Students (1,2)
Price Elasticity of Aided Students (1 ,2)

Funded Institutional Discount Rate (3,4)

Admissions
Selectivity (2)

Endowment per
FTE (4)

Methods of Analysis

Two statistical procedures will be applied to the data to answer individual
questions. Multiple regressions will be used for Questions 1 and 2. Repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used for Question 3 and Question 4.
Method Applied to Question 1

Question 1 seeks to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional
discount rate (dependent variable) and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students
(independent variables). These variables will be subjected to multiple regression analysis
in ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0) using the equation model:

(1)
where Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate in a given year, PEFP
represents the price elasticity of full-pay students, PEpp represents the price elasticity of
aided students, Prepresent the respective regression coefficients, and c represents the
intercept value. This method will be repeated for each of the 10 years from 2000 to 2009
and the resulting models compared for stability over time.
Multiple regression analysis "shows the influence of two or more variables on a
designated dependent variable," which is precisely the goal for Question 1 (George &
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Mallery, 2009, p. 192). Multiple regression analysis is, therefore, appropriate to
determine the influence of price elasticity of full-pay and aided students on unfunded
institutional discount rate.

Method Applied to Question 2
Question 2 seeks to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional
discount rate (dependent variable), price elasticity of full-pay and aided students
(independent variables), and admissions selectivity, which adds independent variables to
the equation:
Du = ~1PEFP + ~2PEpp + ~3S + ~4(PEFP*S) + ~s(PEpp*S)

+c

(2)

where Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate in a given year, PEFP
represents the price elasticity of full-pay students, PEpp represents the price elasticity of
aided students, S represents the admit rate, (PE*S) represents the interaction of the
respective price elasticity measure with admit rate, ~represents the respective regression
coefficients, and c represents the intercept value. This model will be subjected to
multiple regression analysis in ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0) and repeated for each of the
nine years from 2001 to 2009. The period under analysis for Question 2 is limited to
200 1 to 2009 because admissions data was not reported to IPEDS for previous years.

Method Applied to Question 3
Question 3 seeks to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession
from 2007 to 2009. This question requires examining the effects of one independent
variable (year) with 10 levels on one dependent variable (institutional aid ratio), for
which analysis of variance is preferable to multiplet-tests (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007).
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The ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount rates, calculated for each of the 10
years from 2000 to 2009, constitutes a repeated measure, which violates the assumption
of independent observations in standard ANOVA (Weinfurt, 2000). Repeated measures
ANOVA is designed to accommodate measures taken over time, therefore, it will be
applied to Question 3 using ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0).
Method Applied to Question 4
Question 4 seeks to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession
from 2007 to 2009 based on endowment value per FTE. This question requires
examining the effects of two independent variables (year-10 levels and endowment-4
levels) on one dependent variable (institutional aid ratio). As in Question 3, analysis of
variance is preferable to multiplet-tests (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007). The issue of
repeated measures remains, therefore, repeated measures ANOVA will be applied to
Question 4 using ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0).
Since IPEDS only reports endowment data since 2003, endowment value per FTE
cannot be calculated for alllO years ofthe period under analysis. To accommodate this
limitation within the dataset, the average endowment per FTE for the five years from
2005 to 2009 was calculated and used to separate the colleges into quartiles based on the
calculated figure. This technique poses a risk of possibly masking interaction between
endowment and the ratio of institutional aid. In order to be confident of appropriately
reflecting endowment strength, the quartile stability from 2005 to 2009 was analyzed.
Over these five years, only 29 of the 149 colleges (19.5%) included in the sample
changed quartiles in any individual year during the period.
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Table 6
Stability ofEndowment per FTE Quartiles (in %), 2005-2009
Percent in Common between Years
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2005 to 2009
4th (Highest)

100.0

97.3

97.3

97.3

94.6

3rd

89.2

94.6

91.2

89.2

78.4

2nd

83.8

91.2

86.5

86.5

81.1

89.5

97.3

92.1

94.6

89.2

1st

(Lowest

As shown in Table 6, the quartiles are generally stable between years. No college
moved more than one quartile in any given year, indicating the movement is largely on
the periphery of the quartiles. As would be expected, the schools from the 20th to 30th
percentiles, 45th to 55th percentiles, and 70th to 80th percentiles accounted for much of
this movement. Given this stability, the average of endowment per FTE from 2005 to
2009 was deemed an appropriate reflection of endowment strength.
Summary

The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. To this end, this study will analyze IPEDS
data from 2000 to 2009 reported by colleges meeting the sampling criteria. Though
!PEDS data is limited by its self-reported nature, there are sufficient quality checks
within the system and within this dissertation study to be confident of the data's
accuracy.
In order to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional discount

rate and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students (Question I), multiple regression
models for each of the 10 years under analysis will be calculated and compared.
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In order to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional discount
rate and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students and admissions selectivity
(Question 2), multiple regression models for each of the 10 years under analysis will be
calculated and compared.

In order to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional discount rate
to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession from 2007 to
2009 (Question 3), a repeated measures analysis of variance will be conducted.
Finally, in order to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession
from 2007 to 2009 based on endowment value per FTE (Question 4), a repeated measures
analysis of variance will be conducted.

Chapter Four: Data Analysis and Results
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. To this end, the study sought to
address the overarching question: What are the implications of tuition discounting for
institutional market strength at private baccalaureate colleges between 2000 and 2009?
This chapter presents the results of the analyses performed to address the research
questions. Modifications to the final sample occurred due to issues that emerged during
data collection and these changes lead off the chapter. Next, presentation of trends within
the sample creates a portrait of the data. Finally, reporting of the results of analyses by
research question completes the chapter.
Modification of the Sample
Initially, a total of 149 colleges met the criteria for inclusion in the study as
described in the previous chapter. Of these colleges, four were removed during the
analysis stage, leaving 145 colleges in the final sample. Two colleges were removed for
being subsidiaries of a parent institution. The other two colleges were removed for
reporting comprehensive fees, which cannot be separated into the necessary tuition and
fees used to calculate price elasticity. Tables AI and A2 in Appendix A list included and
eliminated colleges respectively.
Description of the Sample
Even though all 145 colleges met this study's definition of a private baccalaureate
college, many colleges in the sample were quite dissimilar from one another. Within a
common focus on undergraduate education, each college operates with a highly
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individualized set of circumstances. As shown in Table 7, the included colleges varied
greatly in terms of published tuition and fees, enrollment, admissions selectivity, and
endowment.
Table 7

Descriptive Statistics for the Sample, 2008-2009

Published Tuition and Fees($)
Full-Time Undergraduates
Admit Rate (%)
Endowment/PTE ($)
Unfunded Institutional Discount (%)

Median

Mean

24,470

25,494

1,218

1,332

62.3

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

8,882 7,870

40,980

636

91

3,028

59.4

18.2

8.6

93.5

49,302

105,412

182,241

764

1,175,646

32.3

31.5

13.4

0.0

79.6

4.7

7.2

7.6

0.0

44.9

Funded Institutional Discount(%)

Three variables highlight the substantial differences among the sample. First,
endowment per FTE ranges from $764 to more than $1.1 million, with nine colleges
more than three standard deviations above the mean. Second, unfunded institutional
discount ranges from 0.0% to 79.6% with two colleges more than three standard
deviations above the mean. Third, funded institutional discount ranges from 0.0% to
44.9% with three colleges more than three standard deviations above the mean. All three
variables have a minimum possible value (zero) that can compress the distributions.
Regardless, these variances highlight the wide ranges among colleges in the sample,
particularly in terms of institutional wealth.
The wealthier colleges differed significantly from their poorer counterparts.
Endowment wealth correlated to higher funded institutional discounts, r(l42) = .453,p <

85
.001. Higher funded institutional discounts correlated to lower unfunded institutional
discounts, r(144) = -.307,p < .001. In other words, wealthier colleges provided greater
funded discounts, reducing discounting through unfunded institutional aid.
Two noteworthy trends emerged among the sample. First, unfunded institutional
discounts increased while funded institutional discounts simultaneously decreased. This
inverse relationship is shown in Figure 11. From 2000 to 2009, the median unfunded
institutional discount rate increased from 27.3% to 32.3% while the median funded
institutional discount rate declined from 5.6% to 4.7%.
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Figure 11. Median funded and unfunded institutional discount rates for the sample,
2000-2009.
Scholarship allowance, the measure of tuition discounting reported by the College
Board and NACUBO, includes both funded and unfunded institutional aid. The median
scholarship allowance among colleges in the sample grew from 35.3% to 40.5% from
2000 to 2009. The increasing unfunded institutional discounts at these colleges provided
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for the growth in scholarship allowance despite declining funded institutional discounts.
Rising tuition combined with less full-pay students required colleges to increase their
scholarship allowance levels.
As shown in Figure 12, the median published tuition and fees increased from
2000 to 2009. In theory, colleges in the sample could have offset the increasing
unfunded institutional aid levels through higher tuition, though, as previously described,
higher tuition and higher discounts go hand-in-hand. The percentage of full-pay students
declined during the same period, however, indicating that discounts were both larger and
given to a larger percentage of enrolling students.
18.0%

12.0%

-+-T&F
-11-Full-Pay

Figure 12. Median tuition and fees and percentage of enrolling full-pay students for the
sample, 2000-2009.
The median percentage of full-pay students in entering freshmen classes has
declined markedly since 2003, an alarming trend for colleges in the sample. Though each
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college operates with its own level of demand, this overall trend indicates a declining
willingness and/or ability of enrolling freshmen to pay full tuition. Given the diminishing
levels of enrolling full-pay students, colleges in the sample may have already passed a
tipping point in tuition price. It is particularly alarming the decline in percentage of fullpay students began before the economic recession from 2007 to 2009.
The second noteworthy trend is the enrollment growth at many colleges in the
sample. Only 17 of the 145 colleges maintained a relatively unchanged enrollment
(varied by less than 2.5%) from 2000 to 2009. As shown in Figure 13, roughly a fifth of
the sample grew by more than 30.0%, including five colleges that more than doubled in
size. Overall, colleges in the sample grew by a median of9.9% during the decade. Not
all colleges grew, however, as roughly one-fifth of the sample saw enrollment decline.
The middle three-fifths of the sample grew by an average of 11.4%.
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Figure 13. Distribution of the sample by percent change in full-time undergraduate
enrollment, 2000-2009.

88
Description of Calculated Variables
All variables included in the statistical analyses required calculation from data
reported directly to IPEDS. The following sections describe the processes used to
calculate variables. Problems that arose are described by variable, including the methods
used to address problema~ic data.
Unfunded Institutional Discount
Unfunded institutional discount was calculated as unfunded institutional grants
divided by gross tuition and fees. Unfunded institutional grants are directly reported.
Gross tuition and fees was calculated as the sum of two directly reported values, total
tuition and fees plus allowances applied to tuition and fees. IPEDS reports tuition and fee
revenue as the net amounts collected, so adding the allowances yields the gross amounts.
Table 8 summarizes the resulting values for unfunded institutional discounts from 2000
to 2009.
Table 8

Unfunded Institutional Discount Rates (%)for the Sample, 2000-2009
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

27.2

26.8

27.2

27.9

28.3

28.8

29.7

30.1

30.0

31.5

Median

27.3

27.1

27.8

27.7

28.1

28.0

28.7

29.2

29.8

32.3

Std. Dev.

13.5

13.9

13.8

13.7

13.1

13.5

13.4

13.3

13.4

13.4

Minimum

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

Maximum

80.7

77.3

78.7

79.4

79.4

81.8

86.0

82.9

82.9

79.6
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Funded Institutional Discount

Funded institutional discount was calculated as funded institutional grants divided
by gross tuition and fees. Funded institutional grants are directly reported. Gross tuition
and fees was calculated as the sum of two reported values, total tuition and fees plus
allowances applied to tuition and fees. Table 9 summarizes the resulting values for
funded institutional aid from 2000 to 2009.
Table 9
Funded Institutional Discount Rates (%)for the Sample, 2000-2009

2000 2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

8.3

8.5

8.1

7.9

7.7

7.3

7.0

7.1

7.4

7.2

Median

5.6

5.9

5.4

5.6

5.0

4.8

4.7

4.5

5.1

4.7

Std. Dev.

7.9

8.1

8.1

7.7

7.9

7.6

7.0

7.2

7.4

7.6

Minimum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Maximum

43.6

46.7

48.6

50.5

49.4

47.5

46.2

46.1

44.8

44.9

Price Elasticity

Price elasticity was calculated from several intermediate variables computed from
data directly reported to IPEDS. As described in the previous chapter, price elasticity
was calculated for full-pay students (PEFP) using the following formula:

PEFP =

((Xppyear2 f Eyear2) - (XFPyearl I Eyeart))
_ _ ___,;.(X-=FPy.. t.:ear=.!. -1_IEy..;,;.z,:::ear~l~)_ _ __
(Pyear2 - Pyearl)
Pyearl

In the formula, XFP equals the number of full-pay students, E equals the enrolling
financial aid cohort, and P equals the published tuition and fees. E is a directly reported
IPEDS value. XFP was calculated by subtracting from E the number of students receiving
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institutional aid (Xpp), a directly reported value. P was calculated by adding tuition and
required fees, both of which are directly reported IPEDS values.
Price elasticity for aided, or partial-pay, students (PEpp) was calculated using the
same formula by substituting the number of aided students (Xpp) for XFP and the average
price for aided students (Paid) for P. Xpp was directly reported to IPEDS. Paid was
calculated by subtracting from P the average amount of institutional grant received, a
directly reported value. Paid was not allowed to be a negative value, which indicated the
average amount of aid received was greater than published tuition and fees. This
scenario is possible if the average aid package provided for expenses beyond tuition and
fees (e.g., room and board). Three negative values were changed to $0 (3 occurrences,
representing 0.2% of the data). These negative values, which ranged from -$656 to
-$2,530, may have been due to reporting error. Each instance occurred at a different
college, none of which showed a pattern of Paid values approaching zero.
The average amount of institutional grant aid was only reported for 2001 to 2009,
which limited the ability to calculate Paid· As a result, PEpp could only be calculated for
the eight years from 2002 to 2009. Since PEpp was limited to these years, PEFP was only
calculated for these years as well. Analyses for Question 1 and Question 2 were,
therefore, confined to data from 2002 to 2009.
A zero value for XFP in a given year proved problematic by resulting in a zero as
the denominator in the price elasticity calculation. If computed as yielding a value of
zero, the resulting price elasticity would inaccurately indicate inelastic demand. In these
instances, a missing value placeholder of"." was substituted (123 occurrences,
representing 8.5% of the data). A total of 38 colleges had no full-pay students in a given
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year during the period. Of these colleges, 25 colleges had no full-pay students in two or
more years, including 11 colleges with no full-pay students in five or more years.
No change in tuition price (P or Paid) between years was equally problematic, also
resulting in zero as the denominator of a fraction in the formula (27 occurrences, 2.1% of
the data). A total of 146 PEFP values, representing 12.6% of the data, were treated as
missing. A total of 34 PEpp values, representing 2.9% of the data, were treated as
missing for any of the described reasons.
If any component of the price elasticity calculation for either full..;pay or partialpay students was missing in a given year, the college was eliminated from the regression
for that specific year. Missing data could result from an omission in IPEDS reporting by
the college or violating one of the protocols previously described in this section. Since
elimination was done on a year-by-year basis, a college could be excluded from the
regression for one year and included for other years. Of the 145 colleges in the sample, a
total of 37 colleges were excluded from at least one year's regression due to missing data.
Seven colleges were removed from more than half of the regressions. Table 10 displays
the number of colleges eliminated from the regression in a given year due to missing
data.
Table 10
Colleges Eliminated from Analyses for Missing Values, 2000-2009

2002
n
%

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

21

15

15

15

19

27

22

26

20

14.5

10.3

10.3

10.3

13.1

18.6

15.2

17.9

13.8
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This level of missing data provides cause for concern. The missing data would be
more problematic if the undertaken study was not essentially of the entire population. As
described in the previous chapter, a total of 179 colleges met this study's criteria to be
considered a private baccalaureate college. The final sample of 145 colleges represents
81.0% of the population. Even after eliminating cases from the sample, no less than
65.9% of the total population was included in a given year.
Once calculated, the price elasticity values varied dramatically among the
colleges in the sample. As shown in Table 11, at least one of the calculated PEFP values
in any given year varied by more than three standard deviations from the mean. Two
values, one in 2005 (11.3 SD above the mean) and another in 2006 (11.2 SD above the
mean) were more than 10 standard deviations from the mean. The percentage of colleges
with PEFP values greater than zero is also reported in Table 11. As described in chapter
2, an elasticity value above zero indicated the presence of a Chivas Regal effect at these
colleges. Normal economic behavior calls for the PEFP value to be negative, reflecting a
decrease in quantity demanded corresponding to any increase in price. In contrast, these
colleges showed an increasing quantity demanded despite an increase in price.
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Table 11

Calculated PEFP Values for the Sample, 2002-2009
2002

2003

2004

2005

2007

2006

2008

2009

Mean

6.97

-0.35

-0.77

52.83

865.81

5.23

4.37

5.01

Median

0.02

-1.88

-0.81

-0.93

-0.11

0.00

-0.65

-1.05

35.78

16.48

64.33

530.00

9,753.19

27.86

38.21

39.09

Minimum

-25.96 -42.67 -595.02

-35.59

Maximum

309.52

96.51

PE>O (%)

50.8

38.6

42.0

40.9

46.5

49.6

40.5

37.0

Outliers (n)

2

4

2

1

1

4

2

2

Std. Dev.

-73.94 -21.14 -25.84 -103.86

393.67 6,081.18 109,913.07 183.20 331.55

283.78

Note. Outliers defined as+/- 3 SD from the mean.
As shown in Table 12, the calculated PEpp values were somewhat more normally
distributed. At least one outlier occurred in any given year, however. Four values, one in
2002 (I 0.9 SD below the mean), one in 2004 (11.6 SD below the mean), one in 2007
(11.7 SD below the mean), and one in 2009 (11.1 SD below the mean) were more than 10
standard deviations from the mean. The percentage of PEpp values greater than zero
indicated the presence of a Chivas Regal effect among aided students at some colleges.
Any conclusions must be carefully drawn in comparing the PEFP and PEpp values.
The mean values suggest greater price sensitivity among aided students compared to fullpay students, however, the median values are much more similar. In fact, the median
values reflect slightly greater sensitivity among full-pay students. Given the presence of
substantial outliers, the median offers a better measure of central tendency. Median PEFP
values ranged from -1.88 to .02 and were positive in only two ofthe eight years. Median

PEpp values ranged from -.04 to .08 and were greater than zero in three of the eight years.
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Further caution must be exercised given the percentage of colleges demonstrating a
Chivas Regal effect in a given year. No less than 37.0% ofPEFP values and no less than
40.4% ofPEpp values were greater than zero in a given year. These percentages indicate
substantial differences in pricing power within the sample.
Table 12
Calculated PEpp Values for the Sample, 2002-2009
2003

2002

2004

2005

2006

2007

2009

2008

-1.03

-0.26

-1.50

-0.21

0.07

-8.61

-0.12

-2.99

0.03

-0.01

0.00

0.08

0.00

-0.04

0.01

0.00

14.27

3.97

17.41

8.06

6.09

106.95

6.65

36.91

Minimum

-156.29

-24.96

-204.08

-78.64

-48.06

-1,259.65

-62.36

-414.31

Maximum

43.67

12.55

11.04

23.73

39.37

113.50

37.10

84.03

PE>O(%)

51.5

45.7

49.0

55.3

47.2

40.4

50.4

47.2

Outliers (n)

2

4

1

2

3

1

2

1

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

Note. Outliers defined as +/- 3 SD from the mean.
In examining the components of the price elasticity formula, several reasons were

found for the extreme values. Given the relatively small enrolling cohorts, these values
could differ substantially in a given year. The average enrolling cohort in a given year
was 337 students with a standard deviation of36 students, or 10.7% of the average
enrolling cohort. Changes of this magnitude in opposite directions could create very
large values, both positive and negative, in the numerator of the price elasticity formula.
In addition, some tuition and fee changes could create very small values in the

denominator of the formula. Given the relatively small size of the numbers at work, the
price elasticity formula proved highly sensitive.
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Beyond typical measures of variability, another problem existed with the data.
Some of the resulting negative values are theoretically impossible. The formula for price
elasticity used in this study divides percent change in enrollment over percent change in
price. As such, the lowest possible value is -100, which indicates that a 1% increase in
price corresponded to a 100% decrease in enrollment. An enrollment decrease of 100%
results in zero students attending the college for that given year, therefore, any lower
price elasticity is impossible. Such theoretically impossible values occurred seven times
(0.3% of the data). These values were attributed to the sensitivity in the formula, in
which an enrollment decline of or approaching 100% combined with a tuition increase of
less than 1% could yield a theoretically impossible outcome.

Selectivity
Selectivity was defined as the admission rate, which was calculated as total
admissions divided by total applications. The applications and admissions data were
directly reported from 2001 to 2009, so the admission rate could only be calculated for
those nine years. Table 13 summarizes the resulting values in each year. Selectivity
increased from 2001 to 2009. Though the change appears incremental, statistically
significant differences did occur in the period. An ANOVA using a Greenhouse-Geisser
adjustment for repeated measures yielded F(5, 609) = 13.551,p < .001. In general, the
increase in selectivity proved statistically significant every two years.
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Table 13
Calculated Admission Rates(%), 2001-2009
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

67.9

65.7

65.0

63.6

64.0

61.0

60.8

57.6

59.4

Median

74.2

71.7

71.1

69.7

66.8

63.8

62.7

62.3

62.3

Std. Dev.

19.4

19.5

19.6

19.9

18.9

19.5

19.9

19.4

18.2

Minimum

11.8

12.4

3.5

13.6

11.8

12.0

10.4

11.7

8.6

Maximum

97.8

99.4

97.6

98.3

98.5

99.0

98.0

97.7

93.5

Endowment per FTE
Endowment per FTE was calculated by dividing the reported endowment value at
the beginning of the fiscal year by the fall FTE enrollment, both of which are directly
reported to !PEDS. The computed values for the year 2004 were problematic. In this
year, more than 87% of the reported values varied by more than 25% from both the
preceding and subsequent years. In examining the reported values both in comparison to
the adjacent years and against values also reported to the Chronicle ofHigher Education
for 2004, it appeared the overwhelming majority of data for this year were reported in
error. Given the widespread erroneous data, the entire year needed to be eliminated from
the dataset.
Given the elimination of endowment data from 2003-04, the methodology was
adapted to use endowment quartile for only 2009 in Question 4. This question asked
how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded
and unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value. As reported in the previous
chapter, the endowment quartiles were highly stable over time as more than 80% of the
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colleges remained in the same quartile from 2002 to 2009. As a final cleaning measure,
the endowment values in 2009 were compared for variance of greater than 25% from the
previous year. This identified three cases, two of which varied by less than 28% and
remained unchanged in the dataset. The third case varied by 99%, so it was deemed to be
a reporting error and treated as missing data. As shown in Table 14, the bottom three
endowment quartiles groupings were relatively tight. The highest quartile, which
included the wealthy outliers, varied widely.
Table 14
Endowment Quartiles for the Sample, 2008-2009
M

Mdn

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

309,561

197,063

274,110

108,809

1,175,646

3

69,538

60,393

18,936

49,970

105,786

2

31,938

30,676

9,003

19,859

49,302

9,615

9,008

5,730

764

19,664

4 (highest)

1 (lowest)

Results by Research Question
Questions 1 and 2 addressed the relationship of price elasticity for both full-pay
and aided students to unfunded institutional discount. Questions 3 and 4 investigated
changes in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount over time. The results
are presented by question.
Question 1
Question 1 queried about the relationship of tuition price elasticity of demand for
full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate. Using the full
dataset, a multiple regression was run for each year from 2002 to 2009 for the model:
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(1)
In the model equation, Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate. As shown

in Table 15, the model was statistically significant for two years, 2005 and 2007. The
regression coefficients are reported for these years in Table 16. The model for 2005
yielded one significant predictor variable, price elasticity of full-pay students. The model
for 2007 yielded no significant predictor variables.
Table 15

Regression Results for Modell (all data included), 2002-2009
Adjusted
Sig.

Rz

R

Rz

SE of the
Estimate

DurbinWatson

2002

.603

.092

.008

-.008

.1166602

1.905

2003

.942

.031

.001

-.015

.1299902

1.941

2004

.118

.183

.033

.018

.1220866

1.684

2005*

.025

.240

.057

.042

.1139619

2.105

2006

.078

.202

.041

.025

.1166765

2.003

2007*

.044

.231

.053

.037

.1160647

2.176

2008

.115

.188

.035

.019

.1167010

2.248

2009

.111

.194

.038

.021

.1204842

2.249

Note. *indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001.
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Table 16

Regression Coefficients for Significant Model Years in Model 1 (all data included)
Unstandardized
SE
~
(constant)

.283

V'l

0
0
N

PEFP*
PEpp

4.2

X

Standardized

~

t

Sig.

27.942

.000

.194

2.237

.027

1.000

1.000

-.142

-1.632

.105

1.000

1.000

.010

10"5 .000

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance
VIF

-.002

.001

(constant)

.293

.011

PEFP

.001

.000

.145

1.592 .114

.999

1.001

PEpp

.000 .000

.175

1.921

.999

1.001

26.820 .000

t-

0
0
N

.057

Note.* indicatesp< .05, ** indicatesp< .01, *** indicatesp< .001.
Because of the mixed significant results when using the entire dataset, the
regressions for Model 1 were run again excluding PEFP and PEpp outliers, defmed as
values more than three standard deviations from the mean. Tables 11 and 12 display the
number of outliers in each given year for PEFP and PEpp respectively. In 2005, a total of
three outlying values were eliminated, including a PEFP value 11.3 SD above the mean.
In 2007, a total of five outlying values were eliminated, including a PEpp value 11.7 SD
below the mean.
As shown in Table 17, the model was not statistically significant in any year with
the outliers eliminated. This indicates the statistically significant results using the entire
dataset were likely caused by the extreme outliers in a given year. The null hypothesis
was, therefore, confirmed. No statistically significant relationship existed between elastic
demand by either full-pay or aided students and unfunded institutional discount.
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Table 17
Regression Results for Model 1 (outliers excluded), 2002-2009.

Adjusted
Sig.

R2

R

R2

SE of the
Estimate

DurbinWatson

2002

.850

.053

.003

-.015

.1178678

2.005

2003

.166

.172

.030

.013

.1294579

1.783

2004

.727

.072

.005

-.011

.1227299

1.706

2005

.173

.168

.028

.012

.1123098

2.010

2006

.351

.133

.018

.001

.1169386

1.860

2007

.946

.032

.001

-.017

.1166006

2.217

2008

.115

.188

.035

.019

.1167010

2.271

2009

.150

.182

.033

.016

.1190813

2.217

Note.* indicatesp < .05, ** indicatesp < .01, *** indicatesp < .001.
Question 2
Question 2 queried the relationship of the price elasticity of demand for full-pay
and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate based on admissions
selectivity. Using the full dataset, a multiple regression was run for each year from 2002
to 2009 for the model:

In the model equation, the new components were represented by S for selectivity and
(PE*S) for the interaction of selectivity with the respective price elasticity measure.
Table 18 reports the results of this statistical model for each year. The model was
statistically significant for all years from 2002 to 2009. ·
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Table 18

Regression Results for Model 2, 2002-2009.
Adjusted
Sig.

R2

R

R2

SE of the
Estimate

DurbinWatson

2002***

.001

.400

.160

.122

.1067200

1.781

2003***

.000

.440

.193

.159

.1156178

1.810

2004***

.000

.427

.183

.148

.1104204

1.536

2005***

.000

.520

.270

.239

.0988444

1.735

2006***

.000

.479

.229

.202

.1029759

1.940

2007***

.000

.466

.217

.180

.1048872

2.182

2008***

.000

.522

.273

.240

.0989291

2.185

2009***

.000

.450

.202

.165

.1097316

2.140

Note. *indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001.
The regression coefficients are reported for these years in Table 19. In2006, mM
SPSS (Version 19.0) excluded the variable for the interaction of selectivity with price
elasticity for full-pay students (S*PEFP) due to collinearity (tolerance= 5.22 x 10-7, VIF =
1,915,113.76). This was the only model year in which a variable was excluded by the
software. Selectivity was a significant predictor variable in all years from 2002 to 2009.
In 2005, both PEFP and S*PEFP were identified as significant predictor variables, but the
collinearity statistics were problematic for both.
In order to address the collinearity issue, the regressions were run again using a
stepwise technique. As shown in Table 20, the models were statistically significant for
all years from 2002 to 2009. As shown in Table 21, with collinearity issues eliminated,
selectivity remains a significant predictor variable in all years. Price elasticity for fullpay students in 2005 and the interaction of selectivity and price elasticity for aided
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students in 2009 were found to be significant predictor variables. In both instances, the
beta values were extremely small.
Given the significant results for the model in each year, the null hypothesis was
rejected. Selectivity was found to be the only significant predictor variable in Model 2.
The other two variables found to be significant predictors in a single year were dismissed
due to the small beta values and exclusion in eight of the nine years. The beta value
reflects the amount of variance accounted for by the variable, so the small values
indicated large amounts of unexplained variance.
Table 19
Regression Coefficients for Significant Years in Mode/2
Unstandardized Standardized
Variable

N
0
0
N

0
0
N

SE

~

t

Sig. Tolerance

VIF

(Constant)**

.102

.039

PEpp

.002

.002

.495

.934 .353

.027

37.210

PEpp

.003

.005

.437

.696 .488

.019

52.126

Selectivity***

.250

.056

.407 4.459 .000

.908

1.102

S*PEFP

-.002

.003

-.468

-.883 .379

.027

37.077

S*PEpp

-.006

.007

-.509

-.812 .419

.019

51.991

.111

.037

3.040 .003

PEpp

-.008

.005

-1.055 -1.606 .111

.016

62.636

PEpp

.007

.009

.211

.741 .460

.085

11.805

Selectivity***

.261

.054

.403

4.815 .000

.982

1.018

S*PEFP

.011

.007

1.098

1.672 .097

.016

62.610

S*PEpp

-.011

.014

-.222

-.778 .438

.085

11.777

(Constant)**

M

~

Collinearity Statistics

2.661 .009
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Table 19 Cont'd
Collinearity Statistics

Unstandardized Standardized
Variable
(Constant)***

'o::t
0
0
N

II')

0
0
N

p

SE

p

t

Sig. Tolerance

VIF

4.192 .000

.137

.033

PEFP

-.001

.001

-.798

1.01~ .315

.011

89.429

PEpp

.008

.009

.242

.907 .366

.098

10.229

Selectivity***

.238

.050

.405 4.793 .000

.978

1.022

S*PEFP

.001

.002

.673

.850 .397

.011

89.655

S*PEpp

-.014

.016

-.240

-.891 .375

.096

10.368

(Constant)***

.130

.034

3.818 .000

PEFP*

.001

.001

6.822 2.600 .011

PEpp

-.005

.008

-.353

.258

.051

S*PEFP*

-.002

.001

-6.617

S*PEpp

.003

.010

.152

(Constant)***

.142

.032

PEFP

.000

.000

-.009

PEpp

-.009

.005

-.542

Selectivity***

.252

S*PEpp

Selectivity***

.001 1093.735

-.667 .506

.023

44.323

.422 5.047 .000

.899

1.112

2.522

.013

.287 .774

.001 1093.588
.023

44.174

-.111 .912

.999

1.001

1.84~ .067

.079

12.729

.051

.417 4.969 .000

.962

1.040

.011

.008

.429

1.468 .145

.079

12.641

(Constant)***

.154

.033

PEFP

.003

.003

.748

1.259 .211

.021

48.218

PEpp

.002

.001

2.100

1.453 .149

.004

285.370

Selectivity***

.236

.052

.399 4.583 .000

.967

1.034

S*PEFP

-.004

.004

-.606

1.02~ .310

.021

48.238

S*PEpp

-.005

.004

-1.970

1.36~ .176

.003

285.989

4.383 .000

\0

0
0
N

r-

0
0
N

4.704 .000
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Table 19 Cont'd
Collinearity Statistics

Unstandardized Standardized

p

Variable
(Constant)***

p

SE

t

.147

.028

PEFP

-.003

.002

-.989

PEpp

.001

.005

.067

Selectivity***

.270

S*PEpp

Sig. Tolerance

VIF

5.176 .000
.206

.011

92.867

.207 .837

.061

16.408

.047

.468 5.725 .000

.971

1.030

.004

.003

.968

1.267 .208

.011

89.890

S*PEpp

.004

.011

.120

.350 .727

.055

18.058

(Constant)***

.155

.036

PEpp

-.002

.002

-.540

-.735 .464

.014

72.583

0\

PEpp

-.001

.002

-.260

-.343 .732

.013

76.873

N

Selectivity***

.258

.059

.383

4.400 .000

.985

1.015

S*PEpp

.003

.004

.561

.763 .447

.014

72.653

S*PEpp

.002

.003

.525

.693 .490

.013

77.035

00

0
0

N

0
0

1.273

4.263 .000

Table 20
Regression Results for Model 2 Using Stepwise Technique, 2002-2009

Sig.

R2

R

Adjusted
R2

SE of the
Estimate

DurbinWatson

2002***

.000

.380

.144

.137

.1058225

1.399

2003***

.000

.405

.164

.157

.1157065

1.419

2004***

.000

.396

.157

.150

.1102653

1.524

2005***

.000

.454

.206

.193

.1017613

1.687

2006***

.000

.446

.199

.192

.1036499

1.583

2007***

.000

.392

.154

.146

.1070449

1.642

2008***

.000

.492

.242

.235

.0992463

1.729

2009***

.000

.443

.197

.182

.1086090

1.740

Note.* indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001.
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Table 21

Regression Coefficients for Model 2 Using Stepwise Technique

Unstandardized

Collinearity
Statistics

Standardized

Variable

p

N

(Constant)**

.117

.036

3.236 .002

N

Selectivity***

.233

.053

.380 4.402 .000

("f)

(Constant)**

.111

.036

3.043 .003

N

Selectivity***

.262

.054

.405 4.879 .000

'<t"
0
0

(Constant)***

.140

.032

4.323 .000

Selectivity***

.233

.049

.396 4.749 .000

(Constant)***

.130

.033

3.903 .000

Selectivity***

.251

.050

4.23 X
10-5

0
0

0
0

N

II)

0
0

N

PEFP**

SE

p

t

Sig.

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

.410 5.015 .000

.999

1.001

.000

.206 2.522 .013

.999

1.001

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

.987

1.013

.987

1.013

(Constant)***

.128

.032

4.025 .000

N

Selectivity***

.269

.050

.446 5.387 .000

t"--

(Constant)***

.158

.033

4.848 .000

N

Selectivity***

.233

.052

.392 4.496 .000

00

(Constant)***

.140

.028

4.936 .000

N

Selectivity***

.284

.047

.492 6.082 .000

(Constant)**

.157

.036

4.368 .000

Selectivity***

.257

.058

.381 4.430 .000

0
0

0
0

VIF

1.000

\0

0
0

Tolerance

0\

0
0

N

S*PEpp**
.001
.000
.274 3.189 .002
Note.* indicatesp< .05, ** indicatesp< .01, *** indicatesp< .001.
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Question 3
Question 3 asked how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009
affected the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates. Using a
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures, an analysis of variance found no
significant differences was among the years 2000 to 2009, F(l,l30) = .955,p > .05. The
null hypothesis is, therefore, confirmed that no significant change occurred in the ratio of
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from
2007 to 2009.

Question 4
Question 4 asked how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009
affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value.
Using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures, an analysis of variance
found no significant differences among the years 2000 to 2009, F(1,125) = .939,p > .05.
The null hypothesis is, therefore, confirmed that no significant difference based on
endowment value existed in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates
following the economic recession from 2007 to 2009.

Summary
A total of 145 colleges were analyzed in the final sample. Though the sample
varied greatly in terms of published tuition and fees, enrollment, admissions selectivity,
and endowment value, two common trends emerged. First, unfunded institutional
discount increased while funded institutional discount simultaneously decreased from
2000 to 2009. Second, enrollment grew by a median of9.9% from 2000 to 2009 with
many of the colleges in the sample experiencing even greater growth.

107

In calculating price elasticity values, the formula was found to be highly sensitive
and yielded a number of extreme values. To account for the large variances within the
dataset, if initial statistical analysis on the entire sample was inconclusive, the analysis
was run again with the outliers beyond three standard deviations eliminated. Given the
number of significant outliers, no defmitive price elasticity conclusions could be drawn
for the entire sample.

In regard to Question 1, no statistically significant relationship was found between
unfunded institutional discount and the predictor variables of price elasticity for full-pay
students and price elasticity for aided students. The null hypothesis was, therefore,
confirmed.

In regard to Question 2, a statistically significant relationship was found between
unfunded institutional discount and the predictor variable of selectivity. The null
hypothesis was, therefore, rejected.

In regard to Question 3, no statistically significant differences were found in the
ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount from 2000 to 2009. The null
hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed.

In regard to Question 4, no statistically significant differences were found in the
ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount by endowment quartile from 2000 to
2009. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed.
From these results, price elasticity must be considered highly individual to the
institution, making general conclusions for all private baccalaureate colleges difficult.
Selectivity, an indicator of demand for enrollment, was significantly related to unfunded
institutional aid, indicating that colleges with lower selectivity award more unfunded aid.
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No significant changes occurred in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional
discounts, indicating the distribution of institutional discounts between funded and
unfunded aid among colleges in the sample was unaffected by the recession of 2007 to
2009.

Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Market strength, the ability to enroll a
sufficient number of students yielding sufficient tuition revenue, is a critical component
of an institution's overall financial strength, particularly at private baccalaureate colleges,
which are overwhelmingly dependent upon tuition for survival.
This chapter discusses the conclusions and implications for colleges and
institutional leaders based on this study's results. First, the findings are summarized and
interpreted in light of the existing literature in the area. Then, the study and its
methodology are critiqued. Finally, implications for practice and recommendations for
further research are offered.

Summary of Findings
The first research question investigated the relationship of price elasticity for fullpay and aided students relative to the unfunded institutional discount rate. Analysis of
the full dataset yielded inconclusive results as the model was significant in two of the
eight years analyzed, though with low R 2 values. Thus, outliers in the dataset that were
more than three standard deviations from the mean were removed and the regressions
recalculated. With outliers eliminated, the model was non-significant in all the years
included in this study. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. No statistically
significant relationship existed between elastic demand by either full-pay or aided
students and unfunded institutional discount rate during the period of analysis. This
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outcome indicates price elasticity for either full-pay or aided students was not directly
linked to unfunded institutional discounting.
Next, the second research question examined the relationship of the price
elasticity for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate based
on admissions selectivity. The model was statistically significant for all years from 2002
to 2009 with selectivity as a significant predictor variable in all years. The null
hypothesis was, therefore, rejected. Selectivity was a statistically significant predictor of
unfunded institutional discount. As selectivity decreased, the rate of unfunded
institutional discounting increased.
The third research question investigated how, if at all, the economic recession
from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates.
An ANOVA using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures proved non-

significant. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. No significant change
occurred in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the
economic recession from 2007 to 2009.
The fmal research question examined how, if at all, the economic recession from
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on
endowment value. Again, an ANOVA using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for
repeated measures was conducted with non-significant results. The null hypothesis was,
therefore, confirmed. No significant difference based on endowment value occurred in
the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic
recession from 2007 to 2009.
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Interpretation of Findings
Any interpretation of these findings must consider the substantial variance among
the measured variables within the sample. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
private baccalaureate colleges in the sample varied greatly in terms of tuition, enrollment,
admissions selectivity, and endowment wealth. The ranges for endowment value,
unfunded institutional discount, and funded institutional discount rate were particularly
large. On the one hand, these differences provided a means to look at the impact of
tuition discounting based upon the variation among the sample colleges. On the other
hand, the small sample size meant that this variability had larger influence on the
statistical fmdings and outcomes. The calculated price elasticity values for both full-pay
and aided students proved highly volatile, both across the sample and even for the same
college in different years.
This study's sampling methodology yielded colleges with a similar emphasis on
undergraduate education, but vast differences in terms of the institutional fmancial
strength supporting that educational model. Financial strength includes factors such as
endowment wealth, net tuition revenue per student, and demand for enrollment. Previous
studies, such as Ruterbusch (2004), used a similar methodology to this study of sampling
by institutional type as have the preeminent reports on tuition discounting by NACUBO
and The College Board. In this study, a significant relationship between price elasticity
and unfunded institutional aid failed to emerge for the entire sample, evidenced by the
non-significant results in several of the analyses. In hindsight, incorporating
methodology to further group the sample according to financial strength may have
reduced the volatility of the price elasticity variables.
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Breneman (1994) described the financial strength of the 212 colleges in his
sample through a composite ranking of endowment per FTE, net tuition revenue per FTE,
and admit rate, but refrained from drawing conclusions for the entire sample or
conducting analyses on the resulting groups. Breneman (1994) instead elected to
comment directly on only 12 visited colleges, which were selected in part to represent a
spectrum of financial strength. The visited colleges intentionally varied in a number of
other areas, such as published tuition price, religious affiliation, and geographic region.
This methodology acknowledged that outcomes can differ greatly among institutions with
a similar educational emphasis, but very different circumstances, as is the case for the
private baccalaureate colleges included in this study.
For instance, private baccalaureate colleges with lower endowment wealth
demonstrated less ability to provide enrolling students with funded institutional aid. As
described in the previous chapter, greater endowment wealth correlated to higher funded
institutional discounts within the sample, r(142) = .453, p < .00 1. Higher funded
institutional discounts correlated to lower unfunded institutional discounts, r( 144) =

-.307,p < .001. In other words, wealthier colleges can provide greater funded discounts,
reducing discounting through unfunded institutional aid. Poorer colleges must rely more
heavily on unfunded institutional aid. All of the sampled institutions qualified as private
baccalaureate colleges, yet differed in the financial model used to support that
educational focus and, therefore, the institutional motivation for discounting tuition. This
study's sampling methodology, which followed the precedent of other existing studies,
did not address these differences.
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With appropriate consideration of the sample's disparate nature, there are several
noteworthy findings. First, selectivity was significantly related to unfunded institutional
discounting. Less selective colleges must increasingly provide unfunded institutional
discounts. The results of this study confirm this relationship, which aligns with a
prevailing theme of other existing studies (Basch, 1996, 1997; Baum et al., 201 0; Bowen
& Breneman, 1993; Breneman, 1994; Buss et al., 2004; Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984;
Redd, 2000). Selectivity serves as a proxy for market size, representing the percentage of
applicants that can be rejected while maintaining desired enrollment levels (Breneman,
1994). Market size is a key component of market strength, reflecting the volume of
potential students in a college's market. Since less selectivity indicates a smaller market
size, this study's findings indicate that higher levels of unfunded institutional discounting
revealed weaker market strength.
The link between lower selectivity and higher unfunded discounts suggests that if
these colleges are not able to increase the size of their respective markets, unfunded
discounting must increase to provide an incentive for the desired number of students to
enroll. Continually increasing unfunded discounts results in a perilous cycle for a
college's overall financial health as discounts eventually reach a level that reduces the net
tuition revenue per student (Jenny, 1997; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998). Such a cycle
ultimately jeopardizes a college's continuing operation, as was the case for Dana College
in Nebraska, a private baccalaureate college that closed in 2010. In its last decade of
existence, Dana College provided institutional aid to between 95% and 100% of
undergraduates, more than doubled the average amount of financial aid packages, and
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increased its unfunded institutional discount from 40% to 53%. The plight of Dana
College revealed the possible consequences of a discounting spiral.
The lack of a significant relationship of price elasticity for either full-pay or aided
students with unfunded institutional discounting was unexpected. Initially, it was
hypothesized that price elasticity would differ for full-pay versus aided students, with
aided students being more sensitive to net tuition price reflected through more elastic
demand than full-pay students. The lack of a significant relationship between price
elasticity and unfunded institutional aid may result from differences among the price
elasticities for full-pay and aided students within the sample. The law of demand holds
that an increase in price yields a decrease in quantity demanded. In other words, price
elasticity is expected to be a negative value. In contrast, under the Chivas Regal effect
increasing price actually yields increased demand because of the association of price with
quality in higher education (Martin, 2011 ).
At least 37.0% of the price elasticity values for full-pay students were greater than
zero in any given year, indicating the presence of a Chivas Regal Effect for those
respective colleges. At least 40.4% of the price elasticity values for aided students were
greater than zero in any given year. These results indicate that the sample was greatly
divided in terms of pricing power in the market. Colleges experiencing a Chivas Regal
effect would have been able to increase price without reducing enrollment. In contrast,
colleges with the expected negative price elasticity values would have been unable to
raise tuition without reducing enrollment or providing institutional aid to offset the tuition
increase. Theoretically, these latter colleges should have increased tuition discounting to
meet desired enrollment levels. This study's methodology did not investigate differences
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within the sample resulting from the presence of a Chivas Regal Effect at some colleges.
Exact conclusions are, therefore, impossible to draw in this area.
Second, unfunded institutional discounting increased from 2000 to 2009. The
median rate increased from 23.7% to 32.3% during the decade (see Figure 11 on p. 85).
Between 2008 and 2009, unfunded institutional discounting jumped from a median of
29.8% to 32.3%. This increase aligned with the dates of the economic recession, though
no significant differences were found in the third and fourth research questions that
focused on reactions to the recession. The nature of these questions, which examined the
ratio of funded and unfunded discounts, did not directly look for differences in funded
and unfunded discounts respectively. This study's approach may have overlooked
significant changes within the individual discounting measures.
Third, funded institutional discounts declined slightly from a median of 5.6% to
4.7% between 2000 and 2009 (see Figure 11 on p. 85). This small change most likely
resulted from shifts in the components of the funded institutional discount rate, which
equals funded institutional aid divided by gross tuition and fees. As tuition increases
outpaced growth in endowment returns and private giving, the major sources of funded
aid, the funded institutional discount subsequently declined. The interaction of these two
components likely explains the modest reduction in funded discount rate.
Fourth, the percentage of full-pay students declined from 2000 to 2009 (see
Figure 12 on p. 86). From 2000 to 2003, full-pay students increased as a percentage of
enrolling students. After a peak of 14.8% in 2003, the median percentage dropped to
5.4% in 2009. This drop could indicate a tipping point already passed for tuition
discounting at private baccalaureate colleges. With fewer students willing to pay the
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published tuition and fees, colleges must provide more tuition discounts to incentivize
students to enroll. This decline in enrolling full-pay students signals a breakdown in the
Robin Hood effect, through which full-pay students subsidize aided students paying less
tuition (Allan, 1999; Hubbell & Rush, 1991). Lower levels of full-pay students reduce
the ability of private baccalaureate colleges to subsidize aided students (Doti, 2004).
Without the Robin Hood effect, unfunded institutional discounts increase because more
students are receiving institutional aid. The increasing level of students provided with
institutional aid indicates the market strength of private baccalaureate colleges overall is
declining.
When examined by selectivity, the sample colleges experienced different rates of
decline in full-pay students. As shown in Table 22, all but the most selective colleges
provided aid to more than 95% of enrolling students in 2009. The percentage of students
receiving aid increased among each of the bottom three quartiles. These differences
indicate the most selective institutions remain able to charge the full published tuition to a
substantial percentage of enrolling students, whereas all other colleges must discount
tuition in order to incentivize students to enroll. Stated simply, only the most elite
colleges still enjoy the market strength to enroll a substantial percentage of full-pay
students. The low levels of full-pay students among the bottom three quartiles
demonstrate declining market strength and does not bode well for the future. Dana
College may prove to be the first of a wave of closures or mergers as others continue
down the discounting spiral. At some point, if it has not already happened, greater
discounts will yield declining net revenue per student at all but the most selective
colleges.
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Table 22
Median Percentage ofEnrolling Students Receiving Institutional Aid by Admissions
Selectivity, 2001-2009
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Q 1 (Most Selective)

57.1

53.0

57.9

59.4

58.9

54.8

57.1

56.2

56.7

Q2

87.7

82.0

87.8

90.1

90.8

95.1

94.4

96.3

95.8

Q3

91.6

92.1

91.7

94.9

96.5

94.7

94.0

96.2

96.1

Q4 (Least Selective)

90.8 92.2 94.7 95.0 95.8 96.7 96.0 97.4 96.7
Note. Admissions selectivity quartile calculated based on the admit rate for 2009. Admit
rates for quartiles were: Q1 (8.6% to 48.9%), Q2 (49.0% to 62.3%}, Q3 (62.4% to
72.7%}, and Q4 (72.8% to 93.5%).
Jenny ( 1997) warned that awarding aid to more than half of students signaled a
point of no return with aiding more than three-quarters of students becoming a selfdefeating cycle. In other words, once a college discounts to more than 75% of its
students, the advantage of marginal cost pricing disappears and colleges must continually
provide greater discounts to the detriment of net tuition revenue, the financial lifeblood of
the overwhelming majority of private baccalaureate colleges. The sample colleges
provided institutional aid to a median of 94.6% of enrolling students in 2009 with only
the most selective colleges hovering just above 50%, Jenny's (1997) point of no return.
With the exception of the most selective, private baccalaureate colleges may have already
entered a self-defeating cycle in which the prevalence of institutional aid, even to
students without demonstrated need, creates ever increasing expectations of institutional
aid. Brown (2007) and De Vise (2011) noted that students increasingly compare
financial aid packages in making enrollment decisions. As McPherson and Shapiro
(1998) warned, colleges may be forced to increasingly award aid merely to keep pace
with their competitors. Diminishing levels of full-pay students suggest the negative
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cycles that Jenny (1997) and McPherson and Shapiro (1998) foresaw may have taken
hold at many private baccalaureate colleges.
From 2001 to 2009, the bottom three quartiles of private baccalaureate colleges
provided institutional discounts at levels exceeding Jenny's (1997) markers for a point of
no return and entering a self-defeating cycle. These levels beg the question: why have
more colleges not closed? Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of cost offers some
explanation. Colleges aiding greater percentages of students made due with the resulting
net tuition revenue. As Bowen's (1980) theory suggests, a college will spend more if
more revenue is available and spend less if less revenue is available. Another possible
explanation for the limited closures was the for-profit sector, which purchased failing
colleges for their accreditation (Blumenstyk, 2010). Increased scrutiny by accreditors
and the federal government closed, or at least greatly reduced, this option (Kelderman,
2009). Though Jenny's (1997) predictions have yet to result in massive closures, the
circumstances are in place in which more private baccalaureate colleges may be forced to
close or merge in coming years.
The increasing percentage of aided students at all but the most selective colleges
supports Breneman's (1994) use of selectivity in his composite ranking of financial
strength. Selectivity represents the volume of potential students interested in a college by
revealing the amount of students that can be rejected while still filling an enrolling class.
As students apply to more colleges than in previous decades, selectivity appears to
increase, demonstrated by declining admission rates in the sample (Hopkins, 2011; see
Table 13 on p. 96). However, when selectivity is viewed relative to all private
baccalaureate colleges, as in the quartiles of Table 22, it becomes clear that only the most
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selective colleges are maintaining their market strength. Despite averaging lower
admission rates, colleges in the bottom three quartiles demonstrated weakening markets
that require awarding institutional aid to a higher percentage of students.
The increasing percentage of aided students, which includes students receiving
either need-based or merit aid, may be encouraging enrollment growth, which Breneman
(1994) described as an expected result of discounting tuition. Enrollment at the colleges
in the sample grew by a median of9.9% from 2000 to 2009. A fifth of the sample grew
by 30% or more, including five colleges that more than doubled enrollment. The
sustainability of such growth must be questioned by the individual colleges themselves.
As Martin (2002) noted, the marginal cost pricing model inherent in discounting tuition
only works when the capacity exists to support larger enrollments. When colleges reach
a saturation point in terms of physical capacity, such as the number of classrooms and
dorms, and instructional capacity, such as the number of professors and space in courses,
the financial benefits of discounting tuition are eliminated. The substantial growth over
the past decade suggests private baccalaureate colleges are at least approaching existing
capacity and possibly reaching or even exceeding their physical and instructional
capacity.
In sum, unfunded institutional discounts increased at private baccalaureate

colleges from 2000 to 2009. At all but the most selective colleges, more enrolling
students receive discounted tuition, indicating the elite colleges are maintaining market
strength in the midst of declining market strength for other colleges. In analyzing the
ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discounts, this study's methodology may have
overlooked significant differences in unfunded institutional discounting and funded
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institutional discounting respectively. The increasing level of unfunded institutional
discounts combined with declining levels of full-pay students may signal the presence of
self-defeating cycles as well as a breakdown in the "Robin Hood" effect (Allan, 1999;
Hubbell & Rush, 1991; Jenny, 1997; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998). The presence of a
Chivas Regal effect for some colleges may have affected the outcomes of this study's
analyses. Ultimately, given the substantial differences within the sample, a college must
closely monitor its individual situation as Leslie and Brinkman (1987) previously
suggested.
Implications for Practice

This study's results can aid practice for institutional leaders establishing tuition
pricing and financial aid policies for a college. First, if not already doing so, practitioners
should consider institutional data on price elasticity of enrollment demand in making
tuition discounting decisions. Without considering information on an institution's price
elasticity, discounting decisions are made in a vacuum. Such decisions allow discounting
outcomes, such as reduced net tuition revenue to just happen, rather than crafting sound,
well-reasoned institutional policy. Given the crucial nature of tuition discounting
decisions, college leaders must be conscious of all relevant information during the
decision making process.
Second, practitioners should devote the foremost attention to the market strength
of their own institution. Institutional differences, including price level, student body
characteristics, financial aid, applicant pools, and competitors among other factors, create
the possibility for wide variance from aggregate results (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987).
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These factors vary greatly from college to college, so each institution must determine and
know well its niche and prospective clientele.
A less selective college should make every effort to increase the size of its
market. This study found these less selective colleges are most at risk from spiraling
tuition discounts. Without sufficient endowment wealth to provide funded institutional
aid, a less selective college must continually offer greater tuition discounts to reach its
desired enrollment level. Continually increasing discounts eventually yield reduced net
tuition revenue per student. Increasing market size, the volume of potential students in a
college's market, must likely include increased admissions efforts, but the ultimate goal
should be to define the college's niche. In other words, a less selective private
baccalaureate college must truly know its strengths, define itself accordingly, focus on
achievable steps supporting those strengths, and be willing to eliminate pursuits that
distract from those core strengths (Stripling & Masterson, 2011 ). Davis & Elkins College
in West Virginia provides a successful example of focusing on strengths under the
leadership of President G. T. Smith. Davis & Elkins defined its small size as its foremost
strength, focused recruiting efforts around personal contacts with prospective students,
and found a surge in admissions after years of decline (Carlson, 2009). Other colleges
should follow this example in expanding market size.
This study's finding that less full-pay students enrolled at all but the most
selective colleges suggested that a tipping point for tuition discounting may have already
passed. Less selective colleges provided institutional aid to a greater percentage of
enrolling students during the period of analysis. Ultimately, as Jenny (1997) and
McPherson and Shapiro (1998) suggested, this cycle becomes self-defeating, reduces net
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tuition revenue per student, and negatively impacts a college's financial health. Each
college should examine its financial aid data for evidence of a tipping point in its own
enrollment. If such a point has occurred, increasing market size to stabilize the levels of
students receiving aid becomes all the more important.
Third, practitioners should ensure similar characteristics and circumstances in
establishing a peer group for comparison. Establishing a well-defined peer group for
comparison should prove more productive in decision making than comparison to private
baccalaureate colleges in general (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). In addition to monitoring a
college's individual market strength, a well-defined comparison group provides valuable
benchmarking information for the wider market. Identifying other colleges with similar
motivations for discounting tuition is crucial, otherwise the data lacks direct applicability
and relevance (Bowen & Breneman, 1993). The goal should be to identify a group of
institutions with similar fmancial and market strengths against which to reference the
college's data.
Colleges often make comparisons to aspirational peers, institutions with targeted
rankings or other characteristics. In discounting comparisons with aspirational peers, a
practitioner must note that institutional motivations likely differ. Different market
strength and discounting levels should, therefore, be expected. Such comparisons require
a more nuanced approach to identify the specific components of financial and market
strength a college would like to reach itself. College leaders should consider these
components rather than setting a specific discounting target.
Finally, practitioners in sectors beyond private baccalaureate colleges should pay
close attention to the outcomes of tuition discounting at these colleges. Public and
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international institutions, which increasingly practice tuition discounting themselves,
must be aware of the possible negative implications (Baum et al., 2010; Dotterweich &
Baryla, 2005; McPherson & Shapiro, 1995; Parrott, 2008). Private colleges were among
the first to adopt such practices, and will be the first to show the ultimate outcomes. All
sectors of higher education should watch the results of tuition discounting at private
baccalaureate colleges for the implications on their own tuition and financial aid
practices.
In sum, practitioners should closely monitor the individual college's strength.

Every effort should be made to increase market size at less selective institutions. Finally,
a well-defined comparison group will provide more relevant data than comparing to all
private baccalaureate colleges.
A Self Critique of the Study
As described by Leslie and Brinkman (1987), institutional differences create the
possibility for wide variance from the aggregate results culled from the data. This
study's sampling methodology yielded colleges with a similar educational focus, but vast
differences in market strength and endowment wealth. These differences within the
sample likely affected the outcome of statistical analyses. As this study found,
discounting differed by admissions selectivity, an indicator of market size. In hindsight,
stratifying the sample based on financial strength indicators, including selectivity and the
variables used by Breneman (1994), might have yielded different results though the
volatility of the price elasticity measures used was extreme in a number of cases.
Second, calculating price elasticities for only enrolling students likely exaggerated
the resulting values (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Bryan and Whipple (1995)
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demonstrated lower price responsiveness among currently enrolled students. This study
used price elasticity of enrolling students based upon the available data. This choice
likely inflated the calculated price elasticity values. Incorporating the entire enrollment
would provide a more accurate value of overall price elasticity for a college, though this
data is not readily available.
Third, the high levels of colleges with price elasticities greater than zero,
indicating the presence of a Chivas Regal effect, may indicate two overlapping groups
within this study's sample. The pricing power of colleges experiencing a Chivas Regal
effect differs greatly from those operating with negative price elasticities as expected
under the law of demand. A total of34 colleges, or 23.4% of the sample, yielded average
price elasticities greater than zero for both full-pay and aided students during the period
of analysis. More than half of the colleges had an average price elasticity greater than
zero for either full-pay or aided students. These colleges enjoyed greater pricing power
from a Chivas Regal effect. If this study's sample includes overlapping groups, it would
affect the outcome of statistical analyses. Price elasticity itself could be used to ensure
analyses include colleges with similar motivations for discounting tuition. Colleges
operating with a Chivas Regal effect would be expected to provide lower levels of
unfunded institutional discount based upon increasing price yielding increased demand.
Fourth, the first and second questions considered the relationship of price
elasticity to unfunded institutional discounting in the same year. This methodology
ignores the possibility of a lag effect in which unfunded institutional aid responds to
changes in price elasticity from the previous year, or years, instead of the current year.
Since administrators would not know price elasticity for the current year at the time
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tuition and financial aid decisions were made, it is plausible these decisions are made
based on enrollment trends from prior years. Hemelt and Marcotte (20 II) incorporated a
lag effect in a study of student price response at public institutions, though these variables
did not prove significant. Nevertheless, a lag effect seems reasonable given the
information available to decision makers at private baccalaureate colleges when making
tuition discounting decisions.
Finally, as previously described, this study considered the relationship of funded
and unfunded institutional aid together, rather than examining changes to funded and
unfunded discounting individually. Examining the separate rates may have yielded
different outcomes in the third and fourth questions.
Recommendations for Further Research
Given the outcomes of this study's analyses, the recommendations for further
research involve refming methodology for examining tuition discounting at private
baccalaureate colleges.
First, future research should examine the tiered differences in tuition discounting
found in this study. As shown in Table 22, the percentage of students receiving
institutional aid differed greatly between the most selective quartile and the remaining
75% of the sample. A future study should analyze differences in tuition discounting
within a stratified sample. Breneman (1994) used a composite ranking of financial
strength based on three variables: endowment per FTE, net tuition per FTE, and
admissions selectivity. Future research should incorporate similar methodology in
examining tuition discounting.
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Second, future research should examine changes in funded and unfunded
institutional discounting individually. As previously discussed, examining the ratio of
these two variables as done in this study may have masked significant changes in either
variable. Based on the descriptive data demonstrating an increase in unfunded
discounting, examining this variable in isolation may reveal the incremental changes
between years resulted in significant change over time.
Third, given the possibility of a lag effect between available information and
decision making, future research should investigate the relationship of tuition discounting
decisions to the enrollment response of the prior year or years. This methodology is more
likely to mirror the information applied by administrators at the time tuition pricing and
financial aid decisions are made.
Conclusion
This study found no statistically significant relationship of price elasticity for
either full-pay or aided students to unfunded institutional discounting. Admissions
selectivity was a significant predictor of unfunded institutional discounting with less
selective institutions providing larger unfunded discounts. This relationship supported
the conclusion that colleges awarding higher levels of unfunded aid have less market
strength. No significant changes were found in the ratio of funded and unfunded
institutional discounts as a result of the recession from 2007 to 2009.
As a result of this study, practitioners should focus on a college's individual
characteristics and circumstances rather than aggregate data in monitoring tuition
discounting levels. The substantial variance, even among colleges with a similar
undergraduate focus, allows for vastly different outcomes in individual institutions.
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Practitioners should consider institutional motivation for discounting tuition when
establishing a peer group, ensuring comparison to other colleges of similar
circumstances. College leaders should think strategically about the distinct components
of financial and market strength, such as endowment size, net tuition per student, or
admissions selectivity, in setting goals for an institution rather than establishing a specific
discounting target.
Future research in this area should consider examining a stratified sample based
on financial or market strength, incorporating the possibility of a lag effect, and
examining the rates of funded and unfunded institutional discounting individually.

In conclusion, lower selectivity is significantly associated with higher tuition
discounting. Beyond the most selective quartile, private baccalaureate colleges awarded
institutional aid to the overwhelming majority of enrolling students. With three-quarters
of colleges awarding institutional aid to more than 95% of enrolling students in 2009, a
tipping point may have already passed for tuition discounting at these colleges, which
could signal a downward spiral like that of Dana College for many other institutions.
Less selective colleges must make every effort to expand their market size, or ultimately
risk closure if a sufficient niche cannot be found to bolster admissions. In regard to
funded and unfunded institutional aid, a change did occur alongside the economic
recession from 2007 to 2009. The limited window of this study prohibits firm
conclusions, but the sharp increase in unfunded discounting must be monitored closely.
As data beyond 2009 becomes available, research can determine if this shift represented a
continuing trend, or merely a temporary reaction to the economy. If truly a shift, the
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uptick in unfunded discounting may indicate a number of private baccalaureate colleges
have begun spiraling downward in a precarious discounting cycle.

Appendix A
Table A1

List of Colleges Included in the Study Sample
Unit
ID

Institution Name

State

168528 Adrian College

Michigan

168546 Albion College

Michigan

156189 Alice Lloyd College

Kentucky

210669 Allegheny College

Pennsylvania

217624 Allen University

South Carolina

168591 Alma College

Michigan

164465 Amherst College

Massachusetts

143084 Augustana College

Illinois

189097 Barnard College

New York

197911 Barton College

North Carolina

197984 Belmont Abbey College

North Carolina

238333 Beloit College

Wisconsin

197993 Bennett College for Women

North Carolina

154721 Bethany College

Kansas

23 7181 Bethany College

West Virginia

154749 Bethel College

Kansas

143288 Blackburn College

Illinois

183822 Bloomfield College

New Jersey

231554 Bluefield College

Virginia

161004 Bowdoin College

Maine

231581 Bridgewater College

Virginia

230825 Burlington College

Vermont

173258 Carleton College

Minnesota

180106 Carroll College

Montana

15 3108 Central College

Iowa

156408 Centre College

Kentucky
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Unit

Institution Name

State

ID
198303 Chowan University

North Carolina

217907 Coker College

South Carolina

182634 Colby-Sawyer College

New Hampshire

174747 College of Saint Benedict

Minnesota

166124 College of the Holy Cross

Massachusetts

178697 College of the Ozarks

Missouri

190248 Concordia College-New York

New York

153162 Cornell College

Iowa

177144 Culver-Stockton College

Missouri

198385 Davidson College

North Carolina

202523 Denison University

Ohio

150400 DePauw University

Indiana

212009 Dickinson College

Pennsylvania

158802 Dillard University

Louisiana

224527 East Texas Baptist University

Texas

133492 Eckerd College

Florida

232089 Ferrum College

Virginia

133711 Flagler College

Florida

212577 Franklin and Marshall College

Pennsylvania

150604 Franklin College

Indiana

212674 Gettysburg College

Pennsylvania

153384 Grinnell College

Iowa

198613 Guilford College

North Carolina

173647 Gustavus Adolphus College

Minnesota

191515 Hamilton College

New York

232256 Hampden-Sydney College

Virginia

166018 Hampshire College

Massachusetts

150756 Hanover College

Indiana

191533 Hartwick College

New York

115409 Harvey Mudd College

California
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Unit
ID

Institution Name

State

212911 Haverford College

Pennsylvania

191621 Hilbert College

New York

101435 Huntingdon College

Alabama

145691 Illinois College

Illinois

153621 Iowa Wesleyan College

Iowa

200156 Jamestown College

North Dakota

225885 Jarvis Christian College

Texas

198756 Johnson C. Smith University
101541 Judson College
213251 Juniata College

North Carolina

170532 Kalamazoo College
157076 Kentucky Wesleyan College

Michigan

203535 Kenyon College
146427 Knox College

Ohio

213385 Lafayette College
220589 Lambuth University

Pennsylvania

220598
239017
220604
198808
218238

Pennsylvania

Kentucky

Illinois

Tennessee

Lane College

Tennessee

Lawrence University

Wisconsin

Le Moyne-Owen College

Tennessee

Lees-McRae College

North Carolina

Limestone College

South Carolina

209065 Linfield College
198862 Livingstone College
153834
213668
173902
146825
151777
230940
192864

Alabama

Oregon
North Carolina

Luther College

Iowa

Lycoming College

Pennsylvania

Macalester College

Minnesota

MacMurray College

Illinois

Manchester College

Indiana

Marlboro College

Vermont

Marymount Manhattan College

New York
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ID

Institution Name

State

220710 Maryville College

Tennessee

226587 McMurry University

Texas

155511 McPherson College

Kansas

101675 Miles College

Alabama

178369 Missouri Valley College

Missouri

147341 Monmouth College

Illinois

140553 Morehouse College

Georgia

218399 Morris College

South Carolina

199069 Mount Olive College

North Carolina

214175 Muhlenberg College

Pennsylvania

218414 Newberry College

South Carolina

199209 North Carolina Wesleyan College

North Carolina

154101 Northwestern College

Iowa

204909 Ohio Wesleyan University

Ohio

107512 Ouachita Baptist University

Arkansas

140720 Paine College

Georgia

121257 Pitzer College

California

121345 Pomona College

California

218539 Presbyterian College

South Carolina

233295 Randolph-Macon College

Virginia

239628 Ripon College

Wisconsin

233426 Roanoke College

Virginia

176318 Rust College

Mississippi

183239 Saint Anselm College

New Hampshire

152390 Saint Mary's College

Indiana

233499 Saint Pauls College

Virginia

148849 Shimer College

Illinois

140988 Shorter University

Georgia

231086 Southern Vermont College

Vermont

141060 Spelman College

Georgia
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Unit

Institution Name

State

ID
199698 St. Andrews Presbyterian College

North Carolina

174844 St. OlafCollege

Minnesota

155937 Sterling College

Kansas

216278 Susquehanna University

Pennsylvania

216287 Swarthmore College

Pennsylvania

206589 The College of Wooster

Ohio

216357 Thiel College

Pennsylvania

124292 Thomas Aquinas College

California

141185 Toccoa Falls College

Georgia

157818 Transylvania University

Kentucky

149505 Trinity Christian College

Illinois

196866 Union College

New York

161572 Unity College

Maine

107558 University of the Ozarks

Arkansas

216524 Ursinus College

Pennsylvania

233912 Virginia Intermont College

Virginia

234173 Virginia Wesleyan College

Virginia

218919 Voorhees College

South Carolina

152673 Wabash College

Indiana

154527 Wartburg College

Iowa

216667 Washington & Jefferson College

Pennsylvania

197230 Wells College

New York

179946 Westminster College

Missouri

168281 Wheaton College

Massachusetts

237057 Whitman College

Washington

179955 William Jewell College

Missouri

107877 Williams Baptist College

Arkansas

240338 Wisconsin Lutheran College

Wisconsin

218973 Wofford College

South Carolina

181853 York College

Nebraska
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Table A2
List of Colleges Removed from the Study Sample and Reason(s)for Removal

Unit ID Institution Name

Reason(s)

217624 Allen University

Reported $0 in unfunded instutional aid for
2000, 2001, and 2003.

160977 Bates College

No tuition and/or fees reported in 2000, 2001,
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
2009. Bates College charges a comprehensive
fee, so separate charges for tuition, fees, room
and board, etc. cannot be determined.

384254 Beacon College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
2009. Missing data for unfunded institutional
aid in 2001 and 2002.

217721 Benedict College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001, 2002, and 2003.

156295 Berea College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009.

139205 Brewton-Parker College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,
2008, and 2009.

230047 Brigham Young UniversityHawaii
176947 Central Methodist UniversityCollege of Liberal Arts &
Sciences
112394 Cogswell Polytechnical
College

A subsidiary branch of a parent institution.
A subsidiary branch of a parent institution.

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2006, 2007, and 2008. Missing data for
unfunded institutional aid in 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2005.

161086 Colby College

No tuition and/or fees reported in 2000, 2001,
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
2009. Colby College charges a comprehensive
fee, so separate charges for tuition, fees, room
and board, etc. cannot be determined.

237358 Davis & Elkins College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001,2002, and 2003.

133526 Edward Waters College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
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Unit ID Institution Name

Reason(s)
2009.

139630 Emmanuel College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2007, 2008, and 2009.

144971 Eureka College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2003,2004, 2005,2006,2007, 2008, and 2009.

212805 Grove City College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2009. Reported $1 in unfunded institutional aid
for 2003. Missing data for unfunded
institutional aid in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, and 2008.

170301 Hope College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009.

145646 Illinois Wesleyan University

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009.

135063 Jones College-Jacksonville

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009.

106342 Lyon College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,and
2007.

198899 Mars Hill College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001, and 2002.

220701 Martin Methodist College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2005, 2006, and 2007.

155627 Ottawa University

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.

107600 Philander Smith College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2005,2006, 2007,2008, and 2009.

148016 Principia College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009.

199582 Saint Augustines College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,and2008.

228343 Southwestern University

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.

102270 Stillman College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001, and 2002.
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102298 Talladega College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
2009.

221731 Tennessee Wesleyan College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004.

228981 Texas Lutheran University

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,and
2007.

176406 Tougaloo College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.

168218 Wellesley College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and
2009.

229887 Wiley College

Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for
2000, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
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